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ABSTRACT
The world is currently in an artificial intelligence (“AI”) arms race,
whereby the first nation to develop AI will become the global super nation.
That country will set the precedent for generations of future economic,
technological, medical, and societal growth. While companies like
Facebook, Google, and Amazon have propelled the United States to the
front of this race for AI dominance, corporations have over-stepped ethical
norms of data gathering and processing: methods necessary for
technological development. Numerous data privacy breaches have left
some consumers unlikely to ever share their data willingly without some
assurances of protection. Noting these corporate scandals and data’s
potential for abuse, many countries have implemented data privacy laws
to protect consumers. Statutes enacted for this purpose include the
European Union’s ratification of the General Data Protection Regulation
(“GDPR”), the United States’ various local statutes, and China’s
cybersecurity law (“CSL”) and its Personal Information Security
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Specification (“2018 Specification”). This Note argues that enacting
wide-spread legislation as a means of protecting consumer data will cause
more problems than it solves. Over-legislating technology will threaten
innovation as tight-leashed constraints on development hinder growth.
The consequences to a nation’s global stance in this race to innovate are
tantamount to individuals’ privacy interests. The real battle will be
treading the line between protecting citizens’ privacy while facilitating
technological growth. After examining the flaws with the GDPR, the CSL,
and the 2018 Specification, this Note urges the United States to enact a
federally binding data privacy statute, incorporating some principles
found within various pieces of legislation, that strikes a balance between
protecting consumer data privacy and enabling technological innovation.
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I. INTRODUCTION TO DATA PRIVACY AND REGULATORY
PROTECTIONS
Every day, over four billion people use the internet, spending
over US$2.84 trillion in sales, and conducting over five billion
Google searches.1 Every click, like, view, post, share, and search
internet users conduct generates data. Companies collect and
process this data to help them better understand their clientele,
provide their users a more tailored experience, and develop their
technology.2 Data collection benefits businesses who can, through
gathering methods, grow and adapt their practices based on the
data-driven insights they obtain.3 From those insights, companies
learn how best to market their products by analyzing consumer
behavior and targeting product services toward specific groups.4
While this is an undeniably helpful asset for corporations and

1. See Grace Park, Note, The Changing Wind of Data Privacy Law: A Comparative Study
of the European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation and the 2018 California Consumer
Privacy Act, 10 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 1455, 1459 (2020) (citing Internet Stats & Facts (2021),
SETUP,
https://websitesetup.org/news/internet-facts-stats/
WEBSITE
[https://perma.cc/N3YB-Q6M5] (last visited Feb. 15, 2021)).
2. See Why Data is Important for Your Business, GROW (Mar. 9, 2020),
https://www.grow.com/blog/data-important-business
[https://perma.cc/T7QQ3BDT].
3. See id.
4. See DELOITTE, THE ANALYTICS ADVANTAGE WE’RE JUST GETTING STARTED 6
(2013).
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consumers searching for certain products,5 individuals fear datagathering practices intrude upon their privacy rights.6 Further,
through analyzing customer behavior and utilizing targeted ads,
data-gathering algorithms either purposely or inadvertently place
consumers in echo chambers, fueling misinformation and
dangerous self-serving beliefs.7
Though the echo chamber-producing results are less than
ideal, technology—especially artificial intelligence (“AI”)—is
essential to societal advancement. As a result, countries
throughout the world are currently in an artificial intelligence
arms race, whereby the nation that develops AI superintelligence
first will likely become the global super nation.8 That country will
be responsible for driving future economic, technological,
medical, and societal growth.9 The type of AI referred to here and
through this Note is artificial general intelligence (“AGI”).
Existing AI finds patterns and makes predictions based on those
patterns.10 AGI, in contrast, refers to human-like reasoning which
includes the ability to make causal predictions.11 While pattern
and causal predictions may sound the same, causal predictions
involve counter-factual reasoning about multiple hypothetical

5. See discussion infra Section II.A (discussing the Author’s experience searching
for a product for hours before an Instagram advertisement showed her exactly what she
was searching for and where to find it).
6. See Shiva Maniam, Americans Feel the Tensions Between Privacy and Security Concerns,
RES.
CTR.
(Feb.
19,
2016),
https://www.pewresearch.org/factPEW
tank/2016/02/19/americans-feel-the-tensions-between-privacy-and-security-concerns/
[https://perma.cc/AE6T-53AW] (“Our surveys show that people now are more anxious
about the security of their personal data and are more aware that greater and greater
volumes of data are being collected about them. The vast majority feel they have lost
control of their personal data, and this has spawned considerable anxiety. They are not
very confident that companies collecting their information will keep it secure.”).
7. See discussion infra Section II.A (explaining what targeted advertising is, how it
works, and how it places consumers in echo chambers).
8. See Indermit Gill, Whoever Leads in Artificial Intelligence in 2030 Will Rule the world
World Until 2100, BROOKINGS (Jan. 17, 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/futuredevelopment/2020/01/17/whoever-leads-in-artificial-intelligence-in-2030-will-rule-theworld-until-2100/ [https://perma.cc/6BDS-645F].
9. See id.
10. Telephone Interview with Scott Mueller, PhD. Candidate, UCLA (Oct. 10,
2019); see also Hal Hodson, DeepMind and Google: the Battle to Control Artificial Intelligence,
(Mar.
1,
2019),
ECONOMIST
https://www.economist.com/1843/2019/03/01/deepmind-and-google-the-battle-tocontrol-artificial-intelligence [https://perma.cc/H758-ZTUQ].
11. See id.
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scenarios that meaningfully differ from observed patterns.12
Consequently, whichever nation develops this type of AI first will
likely become the global super nation.13 That country will be
responsible for driving future economic, technological, medical,
and societal growth.14 While this boost to notoriety may not
happen overnight, even inching closer toward AI
superintelligence can have a remarkable impact on a country’s
well-being.15
Still, some countries are currently struggling with the
dissonance of wanting to promote innovation and advancing
their nation in the technological arms race while protecting their
citizens’ data privacy from potentially data-abusing corporations.
This “protection” will have consequences equally as threatening
to a nation’s global stance in this race to innovate as exposure
does to individuals’ privacy interests. The real battle will be
treading the line between protecting citizens’ privacy and
facilitating technological growth.
In this race for AI dominance, many companies have overstepped ethical norms of data gathering and processing, and their
actions threaten consumer privacy and data security. These data
breaches, including the Facebook Cambridge Analytica scandal,16
have left some consumers unlikely to ever share their data
willingly without some assurances of protection.17 Noting these
corporate scandals and their potential for user data privacy abuse,
many countries have implemented data privacy laws to protect
consumers. Statutes enacted for this purpose include the
European Union’s ratification of the General Data Protection
Regulation (“GDPR”)18, the United States’ various local statutes,19

12. See id.
13. See Gill, supra note 8.
14. See id.
15. See id.
16. See Facebook Cambridge Analytica scandal analysis, infra Section II.A.5.
17. Data privacy scandals are examined in more detail infra Section II.A.
18. Regulation 2016/679, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27
April 2016 on the Protection of Natural Persons with Regard to the Processing of
Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, and Repealing Directive
95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation), 2016 O.J. (L 119) [hereinafter GDPR].
19. See discussion infra Section III.B (referencing examination of various pieces of
US legislation, including analysis of the California Consumer Privacy Act, the Data
Privacy Act, and the Consumer Online Privacy Rights Act).
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and China’s cybersecurity law (“CSL”)20 and its Personal
Information Security Specification (“2018 Specification”).21
Racing to legislate privacy protections may seem logical in the
wake of serious abuses of data privacy, but this Note argues that
over-legislation threatens technological innovation as tightleashed constraints on development hinder growth. Among
countries without privacy protections, one nation stands out:
China.
China is a notorious surveillance state, monitoring its
citizens’ every move as a means of providing governmental
protection as well as gathering information.22 Chinese laws have
historically offered citizens significantly fewer privacy protections
than those of other nations.23 The country’s new CSL and 2018
Specification, however, seem to offer stronger security against
data threats than US policies. These laws center around consumer
rights; providing customers with protections against harmful
private business practices.24 These laws, however, do not restrict
the Chinese government’s access to private data.25 Further, these
new laws seem to offer Chinese citizens the privacy rights desired
by American consumers.26 A more thorough examination of the
20. See Rogier Creemers et al., Translation: Cybersecurity Law of the People’s Republic of
AM.
(June
29,
2018),
China
(Effective
June
1,
2017),
NEW
https://www.newamerica.org/cybersecurity-initiative/digichina/blog/translationcybersecurity-law-peoples-republic-china/ [https://perma.cc/5ZC7-YUQG].
21. See Mingli Shi et al., Translation: China’s Personal Information Security Specification,
A M.
(Feb.
8,
2019),
https://www.newamerica.org/cybersecurityNEW
initiative/digichina/blog/translation-chinas-personal-information-securityspecification/ [https://perma.cc/XZ2C-CZ6F].
22. See Anna Mitchell & Larry Diamond, China’s Surveillance State Should Scare
(Feb.
2,
2018),
Everyone,
ATL.
https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/02/chinasurveillance/552203/ [https://perma.cc/N7PX-GRQA].
23. See Xiaofeng Lin, Note, A Dangerous Game: China’s Big Data Advantage and How
the U.S. Should Respond, 2020 U. ILL. J. L. TECH. & POL’Y 253, 266 (2020) (referencing
James D. Fry, Privacy, Predictability, and Internet Surveillance in the U.S. and China: Better the
Devil You Know?, 37 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 419, 440 (2015)).
24. See discussion infra Section III.C.
25. See Bojan Pancevski, U.S. Officials Say Huawei Can Covertly Access Telecom Networks,
WALL ST. J. (Feb. 12, 2020, 8:41 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-officials-sayhuawei-can-covertly-access-telecom-networks-11581452256
[https://perma.cc/5F9Y3MYW] (referring to China’s laws requiring corporations to disclose private information
to the government at its request).
26. See Deep Tech, Podcast: Want Consumer Privacy Rights? Try China, MIT TECH.
REV. (Aug. 19, 2020), https://www.technologyreview.com/2020/08/19/1007425/dataprivacy-china-gdpr/ [https://perma.cc/5GCA-UBNW].
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two statutes, however, reveals the acts focus more on national
security concerns than on individual rights.27 Still, the CSL and
2018 Specification are more comprehensive than anything the
United States has enacted, though they are less stringent than the
GDPR.
In this sliding scale approach to legislation, the European
Union sits at one end aggressively protecting consumer privacy
rights to the detriment of technology-driven businesses.28 China
sits on the other end with nation-wide privacy protections
deterring private entities from gathering data without consent
but allowing the government and military to do so freely. Where
the United States lies on this privacy spectrum remains to be seen.
With no federal data privacy statute in effect, the United States
offers fewer national protections than the world’s most surveilled
country.29 Considering its dominance in the technology field, the
world will be watching to see how the United States handles
increasing demands for data security while maintaining its
position in the race for technological dominance.
This Note explores emerging legislation in various
jurisdictions tackling the issue of unchecked data collection by
private companies, and whether such legislation harms
technological growth and innovation. Part II explains what data
is and defines key terms necessary to understand the impact data
usage has on society. It explains why data is so valuable while
examining how sharing consumer data with several organizations
has come under fire lately. Part III explains the various legislative
approaches nations have taken to protect data privacy. First, it
examines the European Union’s adoption of the GDPR and
analyzes what GDPR compliance entails. Then, it explains the
various statutes in force in the United States, while noting that the
country lacks a federally-binding data privacy statute. Next, it
discusses how the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) and
several states are unevenly enforcing consumer data-protection in

27. See Samm Sacks, China’s Cybersecurity Law Takes Effect: What to Expect, LAWFARE
(June 1, 2017, 10:56 AM), https://lawfareblog.com/chinas-cybersecurity-law-takes-effectwhat-expect [https://perma.cc/YQ84-4D5Z].
28. See discussion infra Section IV.A.
29. See Matthew Keegan, The Most Surveilled Cities in the World, U.S. NEWS (Aug. 14,
2020, 2:11 PM), https://www.usnews.com/news/cities/articles/2020-08-14/the-top-10most-surveilled-cities-in-the-world.
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America. Finally, it ends with an evaluation of China’s two most
distinct regulations regarding data privacy: the CSL and the 2018
Specification.
Part IV explores what a US federally-binding data privacy
statute should include drawing from the successful aspects of the
GDPR, CCPA, CSL, and 2018 Specifications. In doing so, this Part
examines the GDPR’s shortcomings and how the law can be
harmful to technological innovation. Overall, Part IV analyzes the
impact of each response nations have undertaken in trying to
combat data-privacy misuse. It argues that while the United States
needs federal data protection, a GDPR-sized statute may stifle
competition too much to maintain the United States’ position in
the tech arms race. Ideally, corporations would have more
transparent privacy practices, encouraging consumers to feel
more comfortable with sharing their data. One possible solution
is introducing legislation that requires corporations to use only
explainable AI practices.30 These corporations would also have to
obtain consent from consumers before using their data and to reobtain consent upon any changes to the agreed-upon data usage.
The Note concludes by arguing that the United States can
reconcile the competing interests of consumers, corporations,
and the government with a federal privacy statute that contains
clear and concise compliance obligations.
II. WHAT DATA IS AND WHY COMPANIES GO TO SUCH
GREAT LENGTHS TO OBTAIN YOURS
Data collection is a powerful tool capable of driving
technological innovation far beyond what man could do without
AI processors. Through data collection, companies have created
self-driving cars that accumulate vast amounts of digitized images
to improve vision recognition software.31 International Business
Machine’s Watson also uses AI to analyze digital research
records.32 In only two months, Watson has found six new cancer
suppressors: a feat that would have taken scientists years to
30. See discussion infra notes 357-360 and accompanying text defining “explainable
AI.”
31. See Lynn Wu, How Data Analytics Can Drive Innovation, KNOWLEDGE@WHARTON,
(Sept. 17, 2019), https://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/data-analyticsinnovation/ [https://perma.cc/8XYK-FX8Y].
32. See id.
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achieve.33 In addition to medicine, data has also aided
advancements in ecology,34 oceanography,35 and scientific
processes.36 Of the many types of data,37 personal data refers to
identifiable information like an individual’s name, address,
phone number, employment location, credit card information,
social security number, and more.38 The term “data privacy”
describes the pertinent use of an individual’s information in a
given situation, in light of the expectations of the law, the
individual, and the right to control use and disbursement of that
data.39 Through using an entity’s servers, users who accept its
privacy policy allow the server to collect their data, thus willingly
exchanging their data privacy for favorable services. For example,
users’ disclosure of personal data allows them to activate and use
the internet and social media accounts.40 By gaining control over
consumers’ personal data, companies can enter a user’s behavior
and demographic characteristics into an algorithm that then
informs the company how best to adapt their services to meet and
exceed client demands.41 The more data a company has, the more
it can tailor its services to a particular demographic and improve
its products.42 This, in turn, attracts more users which generates
33. See id.
34. See Lin, supra note 23, at 262 (referencing James R. Hunt et al., Redefining
Ecological Science Using Data, in MICROSOFT, THE FOURTH PARADIGM: DATA-INTENSIVE
SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY 21, 21 (Tony Hey et al. eds., 2009)).
35. See Lin, supra note 23, at 262 (recognizing John R. Delaney & Roger S. Barga, A
2020 Vision for Ocean Science, in MICROSOFT, THE FOURTH PARADIGM: DATA-INTENSIVE
SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY 27, 27 (Tony Hey et al. eds., 2009)).
36. See Lin, supra note 23, at 263 (referencing Mark R. Abbott, A New Path for
Science?, in MICROSOFT, THE FOURTH PARADIGM: DATA-INTENSIVE SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY
111, 111 (Tony Hey et al. eds., 2009)).
37. This Note will only examine personal data.
38. See generally Park, supra note 1.
39. See Park, supra note 1, at 1458 (citing What Does Privacy Mean?,
IAPP, https://iapp.org/about/what-is-privacy/ [https://perma.cc/KQ3M-GGQH] (last
visited Feb. 15, 2021)); see also Data Privacy vs. Data Protection: Understanding the Distinction
(Dec.
19,
2018,
7:00
AM),
in
Defending
Your
Data,
FORBES
https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbestechcouncil/2018/12/19/data-privacy-vs-dataprotection-understanding-the-distinction-in-defending-your-data/#58bfba1150c9
[https://perma.cc/LH8P-T6PH].
40. See Park, supra note 1, at 1459.
41. See Max Freedman, How Businesses Are Collecting Data (And What They’re Doing
With It), BUS. NEWS DAILY (June 17, 2020), https://www.businessnewsdaily.com/10625businesses-collecting-data.html [https://perma.cc/C3BZ-HF3H].
42. See The World’s Most Valuable Resource Is No Longer Oil, but Data, ECONOMIST (May
6, 2017), https://www.economist.com/leaders/2017/05/06/the-worlds-most-valuable-
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more data and continues the process.43 Data collection is
incredibly valuable to technology companies because data, as the
primary input of AI technology, drives the rise and advancement
of AI.44 In 2016 alone, people produced as much data as had been
produced in all of history through 2015, proving that there is
ample data available for processing.45 Accordingly, access to this
abundant data will be crucial for companies hoping to compete
in the AI arms race.46
While data can serve many useful functions, there are
unwelcomed consequences of data collection. Because online
data processing relies on such vast amounts of data from countless
online actors, processors often use consumer data without first
obtaining the owner’s consent.47 A server can obtain consent in
one of two ways: (1) the user can willingly disclose their data to a
company, often by agreeing to a server’s terms of use or privacy
policies, 48 or (2) through indirect means of disclosure such as
mining data through use of cookies, web bugs, tracking software,
or monitoring IP addresses.49 Some find firms’ profiling of users
to be a privacy rights violation but insist that if individuals want to
continue using a processor’s services, the individual does not have

resource-is-no-longer-oil-but-data [https://perma.cc/UF97-FZ6V]. See also Park, supra
note 1, at 1460 (citing Nancy S. Kim & D.A. Jeremy Telman, Internet Giants as QuasiGovernmental Actors and the Limits of Contractual Consent, 80 MO. L. REV. 723, 729 (2015)).
43. See The World’s Most Valuable Resource Is No Longer Oil, but Data, supra note 42.
44. See Lin, supra note 23, at 262 (referencing Cade Metz, As China Marches Forward
TIMES
(Feb.
12,
on
A.I.,
the
White
House
Is
Silent,
N.Y.
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/12/technology/china-trump-artificialintelligence.html [https://perma.cc/EX3K-7YBS]).
45. See id. at 254 (citing Dirk Helbing et al., Will Democracy Survive Big Data and
A M.
(Feb.
25,
2017),
Artificial
Intelligence?,
SCI.
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/will-democracy-survive-big-data-andartificial-intelligence/ [https://perma.cc/U9TX-XLKE]).
46. See Clay Chandler, How China’s Rise as AI Superpower Could Reshape the World,
FORTUNE (Sept. 26, 2018, 8:49 AM), http://fortune.com/2018/09/26/china-aisuperpower-book-review/ [https://perma.cc/U73U-7ZNJ].
47. See Lita van Wel & Lambèr Royakkers, Ethical Issues in Web Data Mining, 6 ETHICS
&
INFO.
TECH.
129,
129
(2004),
https://cdn.tclibrary.org/Rhizr/Files/FkE9DdrKdtH7PAQaw/files/124601.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3ZEN-BUSZ].
48. Park, supra note 1, at 1459 (citing CLARA RUYAN MARTIN & DAVID B. OSHINSKY,
INTERNET LAW & PRACTICE IN CALIFORNIA § 9.3(1) (2019)).
49. See Park, supra note 1, at 1460 (citing MARTIN & OSHINSKY, supra note 48, §
9.4(2)).
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much choice in allowing the firm to continue mining their data.50
In theory, consenting to these practices is simple: if a user does
not want their data mined, they should not use these platforms.
In reality, opting-out of certain services becomes much more
complicated. As social media advances society, lack of
participation may leave individuals feeling left behind. Through
these websites and applications, people are finding new means of
connecting with one another that seemed impossible only a
decade ago.51 From connecting with friends that users have not
seen in years, to finding long-lost relatives and even locating
missing pets, the internet can be a force for good. Social media
“groups,” likes those Facebook allows user to create, have
encouraged participants to form support groups and have even
found organ donors for patients in need, not to mention the
hours of enjoyment users gain from browsing these sites.52
With all the benefits that social media affords, some users,
however, have become the unwitting targets of unsolicited
advertising and data mining. Some companies’ failure to
implement sufficient privacy policies protecting personal data not
only worries users but also enables companies to profit from the
misuse of user data.53 Lately, data collection has come under
intense scrutiny from several governments as well as consumers
due to corporate mishandling of classified information and
unethical data practices.54 The public, as a result, has begun
pressuring the government into implementing legislation to
protect consumer privacy rights.55
50. See Park, supra note 1, at 1473 (citing Joseph A. Tomain, Online Privacy and the
First Amendment: An Opt-In Approach to Data Processing, 83 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 3-4 (2014)).
51. See infra text accompanying note 54.
SOCIAL
DILEMMA
(Exposure
Labs
2020),
52. See
THE
https://www.thesocialdilemma.com [https://perma.cc/D5JY-XDQ4].
53. See Park, supra note 1, at 1457 (citing Justin McCarthy, Worries About Personal
(Apr.
12,
2018),
Data
Top
Facebook
Users’
Concerns,
GALLUP
https://news.gallup.com/poll/232343/worries-personal-data-top-facebookusersconcerns.aspx [https://perma.cc/NE23-FKPU]); see also Brian Byer, Internet Users
Worry About Online Privacy but Feel Powerless to Do Much About It, ENTREPRENEUR (June 20,
2018), https://www.entrepreneur.com/article/314524 [https://perma.cc/AME82V6U].
54. See discussion infra Section II.A.
55. Current US data policies are discussed in depth in Part II of this Note. See Park,
supra note 1, at 1457 (referring to PUBLIC OPINION ON PRIVACY, ELECTRONIC PRIVACY
INFO. CTR., https://www.epic.org/privacy/survey/ [https://perma.cc/ZPS4-WS5L]
(last visited Mar. 1, 2021)).
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A. Notorious Corporate Data Breach Scandals
1. Google is Infested with Data-Mining Bugs
In October of 2018, Google announced plans to shut down
Google+—Google’s attempt at providing a social network
service—after learning of a “bug” whereby external hackers
exploited Google’s software, exposing 500,000 users’ data during
a three-year period.56 Months later, Google found another bug in
a Google+ API57 which exposed 52.5 million users’ data that these
data owners had not made publicly available, including private
messages between users.58 David Kennedy, the CEO of TrustedSec
(an information security advisory service company), stated that
the Google breach “didn’t impact passwords or financial data, but
it did give [Google] the ability to extract large amounts of
information like email addresses and profile data.”59 While
exposing user data is never good, Kennedy realized this exposure
is one risk companies continuously take as they race to provide to
consumers the newest, most advanced technologies on the
market.60 Further, Kennedy, along with other critics, felt Google’s
quick detection in the aftermath of the October incident was
“heartening” as it signified Google’s active monitoring measures
even in a program it planned on shutting down in mere days.61 In
his statement, Kennedy referred to the six days it took Google to
detect and consolidate the November security breach as opposed
to the three years it took them to announce the previous breach.62
While Google’s failure to report the initial security breach
until three years after it began was not illegal, it did leave many

56. See Lily Hay Newman, A New Google+ Blunder Exposed Data From 52.5 Million Users,
WIRED (Dec. 10, 2018, 2:19 PM), https://www.wired.com/story/google-plus-bug-52million-users-data-exposed/ [https://perma.cc/U9JF-3SKU].
57. “APIs are sets of requirements that govern how one application can talk to
another . . . APIs are what make it possible to move information between programs—for
instance, by cutting and pasting a snippet of a LibreOffice document into an Excel
spreadsheet.” Brian Proffitt, What APIs Are and Why They’re Important, READWRITE (Sept.
19,
2013),
https://readwrite.com/2013/09/19/api-defined/
[https://perma.cc/XE7M-876P].
58. See Newman, supra note 56.
59. Id.
60. See id.
61. See id.
62. See id.

2021]

WHAT'S YOUR PRIVACY WORTH?

1161

wondering why Google did not come forward sooner.63 Critics felt
the company’s failure to disclose not only threatened the data
privacy of millions of users, but also cast doubt on Google’s
allegiance to its consumers, alleging Google did not disclose the
breach for fear of embarrassing the company.64 Steven Andrés, a
management information systems professor at San Diego State
University, acknowledged the lack of a legal requirement to
disclose the software vulnerabilities, but found it “troubling—
though unsurprising” that the company was more concerned with
appearances if it chose to report.65 Because Google’s failure to
disclose the breach was not illegal, and because it reported
finding no evidence that “any user profiles were touched,”66 some
find no fault with Google’s silence. Arvind Narayanan, a
Princeton University computer science professor, is often critical
of tech companies’ flawed privacy practices.67 Regarding Google,
however, Narayanan tweeted that companies often fix problems
before they are exploited and that internally discovering and
immediately fixing software issues happens “thousands of times
every year.”68 For that reason, Narayanan feels new laws requiring
disclosure of every threat would be “totally counterproductive.”69
2. Capital One: What’s in Your Data?
While the 2018 Google data privacy violation showed how
external hackers can threaten data privacy, a 2019 Capital One
server breach proved internal actors can be just as dangerous. In
March 2019, Capital One servers suffered a data breach which
exposed personally-identifying information of millions of the
bank’s customers.70 The United States Department of Justice
63. See id.
64. See id.
65. Daisuke Wakabayashi, Google Plus Will Be Shut Down After User Information Was
TIMES
(Oct.
8,
2018),
Exposed,
N.Y.
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/08/technology/google-plus-securitydisclosure.html [https://perma.cc/CGX9-5M4N].
66. Id.
67. See id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. See Rob McLean, A Hacker Gained Access to 100 million Capital One Credit Card
(July
30,
2019,
5:17
PM),
Applications
and
Accounts,
CNN
BUS.
https://www.cnn.com/2019/07/29/business/capital-one-data-breach/index.html
[https://perma.cc/VE3N-3PPC].
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reported that the breach gave hacker Paige Thompson access to
140,000 Social Security numbers, 1 million Canadian Social
Insurance numbers, and 80,000 bank account numbers.71
Additionally, Thompson accessed an unknown number of
customers’ personal information such as names, addresses, credit
scores, credit limits, balances, and more.72 Capital One stored the
personal data on external Amazon servers.73 Thompson, a former
Amazon tech software engineer familiar with the technology, was
able to hack into Amazon’s servers by exploiting a “misconfigured
web application firewall.”74 In a statement, Thompson explained
she used a command to extract files Capital One had stored on
Amazon servers.75 Capital One claims to have fixed the
vulnerability and does not feel the information gained was used
for fraud or shared with third parties.76 While Capital One has
taken steps to fix the server weaknesses and has worked with
customers to restore their losses, many feel the hack demonstrates
the dangers of companies relying on authorized third parties
when securing sensitive data.77
3. TikTok’s Data Flops
While internal hackers can pose an existential threat to
corporations, sometimes company practices alone threaten users’
safety and data. The targeting of children in corporate data
collection and sharing practices compounds user fears of data
security breaches.78 On February 27, 2019, TikTok’s79 parent
71. See id.
72. See id.
73. See id.
74. Id.
75. See id.
76. See id.
77. See Hannah Murphy & Shannon Bond, Capital One Data Breach Sparks Cloud
Security Fears, FIN. TIMES (July 30, 2019), https://www.ft.com/content/5b3046ca-b2d411e9-bec9-fdcab53d6959 [https://perma.cc/R4AH-89LP]; but see LILLIAN ABLOM, PAUL
HEATON, DIANA CATHERINE LAVERY & SASHA ROMANOSKY, CONSUMER ATTITUDES
TOWARD DATA BREACH NOTIFICATIONS AND LOSS OF PERSONAL INFORMATION (RAND
Corp. 2016) (noting that the vast majority of data breaches are discovered by third
parties, rather than the affected company).
78. See Stephanie Simon, The Big Biz of Spying on Little Kids, POLITICO (May 17, 2014,
1:32 PM), https://www.politico.com/story/2014/05/data-mining-your-children-106676
[https://perma.cc/CTY8-FG4G].
79. TikTok is a social media app that allows users to upload short video clips, usually
involving songs and popular dance trends. It rapidly grew in popularity, surpassing other
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company, ByteDance, responded to allegations that TikTok
illegally collected the data of minors and agreed to pay the FTC a
US$5.7 million settlement.80 The excessive fines imposed on the
social media company were not solely a response to the data
abuses, but to penalize the company for unlawfully targeting
children.81 Companies’ collection of data or information from
children under thirteen years old without parental permission
violates the United States’ Children’s Online Privacy Protection
Act of 1998 (“COPPA”).82 The issue with allowing children on
TikTok, according to one reporter, is that children rarely
understand the complexities or necessities of privacy.83 FTC Chair
Joe Simons admitted that the operators of TikTok knew children
used their app, but continued to collect personal information
from their accounts without seeking parental consent before
doing so.84 While TikTok has paid the US$5.7 million FTC fine,
as of May 2020, children’s advocacy groups continue to criticize
TikTok for failing to take down child-created content as promised
under the February 2019 FTC agreement.85 These advocacy
groups claim the company still unlawfully collects information
from children’s accounts and shares that data with third parties
for advertising purposes.86
TikTok has also faced other serious allegations over data
security breaches within the app. According to Israeli
cybersecurity company CheckPoint, the app has “serious
vulnerabilities” that can afford hackers access and control over
user data, revealing personal information.87 These weaknesses

popular social media sites such as Snapchat and Twitter in app store downloads by only
its second birthday. See Chavie Lieber, TikTok has Been Illegally Collecting Children’s Data,
(Feb.
28,
2019,
2:50
PM),
https://www.vox.com/theVOX
goods/2019/2/28/18244996/tiktok-children-privacy-data-ftc-settlement
[https://perma.cc/M2YC-6YYW].
80. See id.
81. See id.
82. 15 U.S.C.S. § 6501 (Lexis Advance through Pub. L. No. 116-158).
83. See Lieber, supra note 79.
84. See id.
85. See Advocacy Group Says TikTok Violated FTC Consent Decree and Children’s Privacy
Rules, REUTERS (May 14, 2020), https://www.reuters.com/article/idUSL1N2CV2LV
[https://perma.cc/K52B-CYDE].
86. See id.
87. Ronen Bergman, Sheera Frenkel & Raymond Zhong, Major TikTok Security Flaws
TIMES
(Jan.
08,
2020),
Found,
N.Y.
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would have enabled hackers to reach TikTok users by sending
messages with malicious links that, once opened, would grant the
hackers control over the accounts and their content (including
private videos).88 CheckPoint tested these alleged vulnerabilities
and found they were able to send themselves malware infested
links that gave them complete access to others’ accounts.89
In addition to private sector data privacy concerns, the
Trump administration has also faced internal data privacy
concerns.90 Throughout much of 2020, President Trump alleged
that TikTok posed a threat to national security because of its ties
to the Chinese government.91 The President feared the app
gathers data for the Chinese Communist Party to enable them to
spy on American users.92 TikTok denies allegations of both
censorship and user data sales, though its privacy policies
explicitly mention the distribution of user data to third-party
sites.93 While the Trump Administration’s fears of data-gathering
as a means of Chinese governmental surveillance may seem farfetched, even xenophobic to some,94 Chinese surveillance of
American tech usage is nothing new.

https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/08/technology/tiktok-security-flaws.html
[https://perma.cc/AA66-H5B4].
88. See id.
89. See id.
90. See Selina Wang, TikTok’s US Ban Is On Hold. What Comes Next?, CNN BUS. (Oct.
5,
2020),
https://www.cnn.com/2020/10/05/tech/tiktok-what-next-intlhnk/index.html [https://perma.cc/8ATA-HXTM].
91. Shirin Ghaffary, Do You Really Need to Worry About Your Security on TikTok? Here’s
(Aug.
11,
2020,
10:00
AM),
What
We
Know.,
VOX
https://www.vox.com/recode/2020/8/11/21363092/why-is-tiktok-national-securitythreat-wechat-trump-ban [https://perma.cc/MJ4P-8M7F].
92. See Wang, supra note 90.
93. See Bergman, supra note 87 (stating “American lawmakers have expressed
concern that TikTok censors material that the Chinese government does not like and
allows Beijing to collect user data. TikTok has denied both accusations.”); see generally
TikTok Privacy Policy, TIKTOK, https://www.tiktok.com/legal/privacy-policy?lang=en
[https://perma.cc/2VJW-EZ98] (last visited Oct. 8, 2020).
94. See, e.g., Alexander Urbelis, Trump’s TikTok Worries Are Grounded in Xenophobia
INQUIRER
(Aug.
04,
2020),
and
Fear,
PHILA.
https://fusion.inquirer.com/opinion/commentary/trump-tiktok-ban-china-microsoft20200804.html [https://perma.cc/5FNW-WSZ7].
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4. Huawei’s Tele-miscommunication
For years, countries like the United States and Germany have
opposed the domestic sale and use of Chinese tech company
Huawei’s products.95 Government leaders cite Huawei as a grave
threat to national security.96 Countries fear the Chinese
government can spy on Huawei-device owners through
“backdoors” installed in Huawei electronic devices.97 When
referring to accessing a computer system or software, “backdoors”
are “undocumented portal[s] that allow[] an administrator to
enter the system to troubleshoot or do upkeep.”98 It can, however,
also refer to “a secret portal that hackers and intelligence
agencies use to gain illicit access [to a users’ system].”99 Many
countries require telecom-equipment manufacturers to build in
backdoors to information stored on devices for legitimate and
lawful interception purposes.100 In almost every nation, strict laws
govern when and how governments may use these backdoors.101
United States officials warn that Huawei devices can preserve
access to networks without the carriers’ knowledge or consent.102
While Huawei has insisted that it has never spied on behalf of any
country and would refuse a request to do so, Huawei’s backdoors
make it possible for the Chinese government to access user
data.103 Based on the country’s laws,104 if the Beijing government
wanted such access, Huawei would be compelled to provide it.105

95. See Pancevski, supra note 25.
96. See id. (citing a confidential memo written by the German Foreign Office and
posted in the Wall Street Journal providing “smoking gun” evidence that Huawei
equipment posed a spying risk (to foreign governments and citizens)).
97. See id.
98. Kim Zetter, Hacker Lexicon: What is a Backdoor?, WIRED (Dec. 11, 2014, 6:35 AM),
https://www.wired.com/2014/12/hacker-lexicon-backdoor/
[https://perma.cc/D2VR-JNBG].
99. Id.
100. See Pancevski, supra note 25.
101. See id.; see also discussion infra Part III.
102. See Pancevski, supra note 25.
103. See id.
104. See infra Section III.C.
105. See Pancevski, supra note 25 (referring to China’s laws requiring corporations
disclose private information to the government at its request).
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5. Facebook Gets Political
Another danger in unchecked collection and misuse of user
data is that parties can use the gathered data to manipulate users’
future behaviors. In a targeted advertising campaign, an
algorithm reviews a consumer’s search trends and demographics
to feed consumers products or information the algorithm
determines consumers will find satisfactory.106 Targeted
advertising of products can be beneficial to both consumers and
marketers. Without targeted advertising, searching the internet
for a specific item can take hours or days before finding
something remotely close to the search target. In contrast, data
gathering applications like Instagram can comb through a user’s
searches, find the most closely related products to the search
terms, and recommend the exact item for which the consumer
spent hours searching.107 For example, a consumer who searches
for a red, cowl neck, silk dress may encounter an ad on the user’s
Instagram account advertising the exact dress sold at Nordstrom.
The user purchases the dress while the manufacturer, Nordstrom,
makes a sale thanks to Instagram’s targeted advertising to a
particular consumer.
While this experience is helpful, even desirable, the ads do
not stop at clothing. Companies employing this practice collect
consumers’ information and draw conclusions about the
consumers’ demographics, which can then be used against the
consumer through pointed advertising, swaying the consumers’
opinions.108 In this way, targeted advertising practices often lead
to confirmation bias and providers placing unsuspecting
consumers into echo chambers wherein consumers are shown
affirmatory articles at the top of their search results, rather than
relevant and factual information, even if these results do not align

106. See JOE PLUMMER, STEVE RAPPAPORT & TADDY HALL, THE ONLINE ADVERTISING
PLAYBOOK: PROVEN STRATEGIES AND TESTED TACTICS FROM THE ADVERTISING RESEARCH
FOUNDATION (John Wiley & Sons, Inc. ed., 1st ed. 2007).
107. See id.
108. See Rebecca Walker Reczek et al., Targeted Ads Don’t Just Make You More Likely
to Buy — They Can Change How You Think About Yourself, HARV. BUS. REV. (Apr. 4, 2016),
https://hbr.org/2016/04/targeted-ads-dont-just-make-you-more-likely-to-buy-they-canchange-how-you-think-about-yourself [https://perma.cc/9UMY-G4ZF]; see also Leslie K.
John et al., Ads That Don’t Overstep, HARV. BUS. REV. (Jan. 2018),
https://hbr.org/2018/01/ads-that-dont-overstep [https://perma.cc/BT9R-6NWX].
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with the user’s views.109 This negative feedback loop, created via
the same traditionally helpful technology, fuels misinformation
and leads to amplification of consumers’ preconceived beliefs.
In 2014, political consulting firm Cambridge Analytica
secured a US$15 million investment after persuading wealthy
Republican donor, Robert Mercer, and his political advisor,
Stephen Bannon, of its ability to sway the 2016 US presidential
election in their party’s favor.110 Cambridge Analytica boasted
psychoanalytic tools capable of identifying personality traits of
American voters that could influence their behavior.111
Cambridge Analytica planned to use the information obtained
with these tools to inform targeted political advertising on the
social media platform Facebook.112 The new algorithm
Cambridge promised to develop would specifically track users
who were “more prone to impulsive anger or conspiratorial
thinking than average citizens.”113 To obtain the necessary data to
build this tool, the firm “harvested” privileged information from
more than 50 million Facebook users’ accounts without their
permission.114 Of the 50 million, approximately 270,000 users had
consented to sharing their data.115 That means only half of one
percent of all Facebook users gave permission to Facebook to
share the data with Cambridge Analytica. After illicitly gaining the
necessary data to develop this tool, Cambridge used “various
methods, such as Facebook group posts, ads, sharing articles or
even creating fake Facebook pages to provoke these [easily
angered] users.”116 Confirming what many Americans feared
109. See Giovanni Luca Ciampaglia & Filippo Menczer, Biases Make People Vulnerable
to Misinformation Spread by Social Media, SCI. AM. (June 21, 2018),
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/biases-make-people-vulnerable-tomisinformation-spread-by-social-media/ [https://perma.cc/U9XG-ZTCS].
110. See Matthew Rosenberg, Nicholas Confessore & Carole Cadwalladr, How Trump
Consultants Exploited the Facebook Data of Millions, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 17, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/17/us/politics/cambridge-analytica-trumpcampaign.html [https://perma.cc/K6V2-DNZL].
111. See id.
112. See Rosalie Chan, The Cambridge Analytica Whistleblower Explains How the Firm
used Facebook Data to Sway Elections, BUS. INSIDER (Oct. 5, 2019, 5:53 PM),
https://www.businessinsider.com/cambridge-analytica-whistleblower-christopher-wyliefacebook-data-2019-10 [https://perma.cc/N75W-SJN9].
113. Rosenberg et al., supra note 110.
114. See id.
115. See id.
116. Chan, supra note 112.
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from big tech companies, one of Cambridge Analytica’s founding
members, Christopher Wylie, admitted in an interview that
“[r]ules don’t matter for [Big Tech company leaders].”117
Further, reviews of the firm’s emails and documents revealed
that as of March 2018, years later, Cambridge still possessed most
or all of the wrongfully gathered data.118 The data collected
included users’ potentially identifying information including
name, address, email address, phone number, place of work, etc.
The collected data also included users’ networks, meaning other
users with whom the original user has connected, or “friended,”
and reactions to posts their friends have shared, known as
“likes.”119 Facebook’s Deputy General Counsel stated that
Cambridge Analytica certified that all data it had collected has
since been destroyed.120 Confirming this statement, however, may
be near impossible since copies of the data remain beyond
Facebook’s control.121 Aside from Cambridge Analytica not
obtaining consent from the data’s owners, an especially insidious
problem with its targeted advertising practice is that it feeds
consumers products, news stories, and social media posts that
reflect the consumer’s views, even if those views are deluded,
conspiratorial, or hateful. Targeted advertising effectively
prevents providing users with alternative, more credible
perspectives.
III. LEGISLATIVE APPROACHES TO DATA-PRIVACY AND
SECURITY IN THE EUROPEAN UNION, UNITED STATES, AND
CHINA
Regarding data and technology, the European Union, the
United States, and China have set different standards in the way
of legislative protection.122 The European Union has recently
enacted one of the most expansive regulations in the data-privacy

117. Rosenberg et al., supra note 110.
118. See id.
119. See id.
120. See id.
121. See id.
122. Other nations have also enacted laws in the data-privacy area, however, the
scope of this Note will be limited to examining data-privacy rights and legislation
affecting the European Union, the United States, and China only.
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field: the General Data Protection Regulation (“GDPR”).123
While the United States has some state-adopted statutes, neither
the United States nor China have federally-binding laws
protecting general consumer data.124 Though nations around the
world are racing to be the first to develop AI, two countries forge
far ahead of the rest: the United States and China. Whoever wins
this race will “define generations of technology to come.”125
Given the necessity of access to data in developing AI, Chinese
companies appear to be better positioned to take the lead.
China’s over 800 million “netizens,”126—active internet
community participants—use their cell phones more actively
than Americans do, thus creating more data on Chinese
devices.127 As of December 2019, China’s 854 million internet
users more than double America’s 313 million users.128 Further,
China’s plans to develop their AI include investing US$7 billion
in the industry by 2030.129
The European Union is also investing significantly in the
field, pledging US$24 billion in a two-year period.130 While the
United States has not discussed its plans, it is currently the world
leader in technological development.131 Additionally, while China
may have the highest number of data contributors, 132 Americans
still contribute the greatest amount of online content to the
internet.133 Consumers may fear, however, that nations’ push to
innovate will encourage governments to allow developers almost
unfettered use of private data to advance their respective nation’s
123. GDPR, supra note 18.
124. See discussion infra Section III.B-C.
125. Dave Gershgorn, Forget The Space Race, The AI Race Is Just Beginning, WORLD
ECON. F. (May 8, 2018), https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2018/05/ai-is-the-newspace-race [https://perma.cc/MP82-H7UT].
https://www.merriam126. Netizen,
MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM,
webster.com/dictionary/netizen [https://perma.cc/45YN-YJ5C] (last visited Oct. 23,
2020).
127. See Chandler, supra note 46.
128. See J. Clement, Countries with the highest number of internet users as of December
2019, STATISTA (June 25, 2020), https://www.statista.com/statistics/262966/number-ofinternet-users-in-selected-countries/ [https://perma.cc/LEH2-5UFC].
129. See Gershgorn, supra note 125.
130. See id.
131. Metz, supra note 44.
132. See Clement, supra note 128.
133. Generating online content contributes highly to data creation and
development.
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global stance. On the other hand, technology experts and
developers worry over-legislation, to protect consumer data
privacy, will stifle competition and innovation.134
The United States currently has bills pending before
Congress calling for greater enforcement of data-privacy
protections,135 but China’s authoritarian regime will likely never
codify generalized privacy rights. Some technology experts credit
this lack of regulation for rapid advancements in technology,
especially during the internet’s naissance.136 This Part will discuss
nations’ legislative approaches to combatting data-privacy abuses
by analyzing various pieces of legislation that have been either
introduced or enacted as a response to data privacy breaches.
A. The European Union Enacts One of the Most Comprehensive DataPrivacy Laws: The GDPR
According to Article 16(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning
of the European Union (“TFEU”), the GDPR emerged out of
necessity from its predecessor, the 1995 European Union Data
Protection Directive (“1995 Directive”), 137 due to the “rapidly
changing landscape in data storage, collection, and transfer.” 138
In light of the TFEU’s mission to establish that data privacy
protection is a fundamental right,139 the GDPR aims to
“strengthen, unify, and make more coherent data protection laws
and its framework across the twenty-seven European Union
member states.”140

134. See Zen Soo, Alibaba’s Jack Ma says he is ‘worried’ Europe will stifle innovation with
too much tech regulation, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST (May 17, 2019),
https://www.scmp.com/tech/big-tech/article/3010606/alibabas-jack-ma-says-heworried-europe-will-stifle-innovation-too [https://perma.cc/JG5S-2QB9].
135. See discussion infra Section III.B (discussing the Consumer Online Privacy
Rights Act (“COPRA”) and the Digital Accountability and Transparency to Advance
Privacy Act (“Data Privacy Act”) as examples of some of the bills pending before
Congress).
136. See Soo, supra note 134.
137. Directive 95/46/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council on the
Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free
Movement of Such Data, art. 25, 1995 O.J. (L 281) [hereinafter Directive 95/46/EC].
138. GDPR, supra note 18; accord Park, supra note 1, at 1466.
139. Park, supra note 1, at 1465 (citing Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union, art. 16, Dec. 13, 2007, 2012 O.J. (C 326), 1).
140. Park, supra note 1, at 1467 (citing GDPR, supra note 18, arts. 7, 9, 10).
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The pre-GDPR European Union hoped to solve what is
currently the United States’ main issue: numerous state-level
regulations establishing independent policies, rather than a
unified, federally binding statute. This issue and subsequent ideal
of a single unifying piece of legislation is precisely why the
European Commission replaced the 1995 Directive with the
GDPR.141 In doing so, the European Commission had two goals
in mind: (1) fixing the imbalance of competition created through
varying legislation across the European Union, and (2)
reinforcing its implementation to bolster compliance with the
European Union’s laws amongst various organizations and
member states.142
The GDPR heavily emphasizes consumer protections, setting
strict requirements for data processors, such as companies and
data controllers, and use and storage of user data. The regulation
requires explicit and informed consent from users before
processors may use their data.143 It also places strict penalties on
noncompliant corporations to dissuade unfair practices and
imposes a strict compliance deadline.144 Most importantly, the
GDPR greatly expands the rights of consumers regarding the use
of their data.145
The GDPR requires data subjects146—identified or
identifiable natural persons—to give clearly established,
informed, and affirmative consent to data processors147
responsible for the collection and usage of subjects’ mined
data.148 Affirmative consent means that “[s]ilence, pre-ticked

141. See Nate Lord, What is the Data Protection Directive? The Predecessor to the GDPR,
DIGIT. GUARDIAN (Sept. 12, 2018), https://digitalguardian.com/blog/what-dataprotection-directive-predecessor-gdpr [https://perma.cc/92YW-Z9M4].
142. See GDPR, supra note 18, at 9.
143. See generally GDPR, supra note 18.
144. See id.
145. See id.
146. GDPR, supra note 18, at 33 (“[P]ersonal data’ means any information relating
to an identified or identifiable natural person (‘data subject’); an identifiable natural
person is one who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to
an identifier such as a name, an identification number, location data, an online identifier
or to one or more factors specific to the physical, physiological, genetic, mental,
economic, cultural or social identity of that natural person.”).
147. “[A] natural or legal person, public authority, agency or other body which
processes personal data on behalf of the controller.” Id.
148. Id. at 32.
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boxes or inactivity should not therefore constitute consent.”149
The GDPR’s proscription of acceptance-through-silence nullifies
providers’ abilities to use an “Opt-Out approach” to obtain user
consent to data usage.150 The Opt-Out method refers to a
processor’s ability to automatically collect user data, unless the
user affirmatively manifests an unwillingness to comply.151
Moreover, the data controller must be able to demonstrate that
the data subject has consented to the processing of personal data
through a written agreement “clearly distinguishable from the
other matters” and presented in an “intelligible and easily
accessible form.”152 Consent, as required by the GDPR, must
always be clearly distinguishable from other terms of service and
cannot be hidden within other text.153 As an example, upon
visiting many websites for the first time, users are immediately
presented with a pop-up notice preventing them from navigating
further without first consenting to privacy policies. Further, the
GDPR establishes that data subjects must be able to withdraw
consent “at any time as easily as it was to give consent.”154 In
enacting this provision, the GDPR requires that data collection be
purpose-limited, meaning a user’s consent expires upon
fulfillment of the purpose for which it was collected.155
Additionally, the GDPR provides for automatic termination of
consent if the data is no longer necessary for the originally stated
purpose.156
The European Court of Justice (“ECJ”) also recognized the
right to be forgotten—a right codified in Article 17 of the
GDPR.157 The right to be forgotten allows data subjects who no

149. Id.
150. See Park, supra note 1, at 1476. The GDPR has removed any possibility of optout consent in its other provisions.
151. See Brian Barrett, Hey, Apple! ‘Opt Out’ Is Useless. Let People Opt In, WIRED (Aug.
2, 2019, 4:32 PM), https://www.wired.com/story/hey-apple-opt-out-is-useless/
[https://perma.cc/E299-8SC9].
152. Park, supra note 1, at 1477 (citing GDPR, supra note 18, art. 7, at 1-2).
153. Detlev Gabel & Tim Hickman, Chapter 8: Consent – Unlocking the EU General
&
CASE
(Apr.
5,
2019),
Data
Protection
Regulation,
WHITE
https://www.whitecase.com/publications/article/chapter-8-consent-unlocking-eugeneral-data-protection-regulation [https://perma.cc/Z8KE-QHHE].
154. Park, supra note 1, at 1477 (citing GDPR, supra note 18, art. 7, at 3).
155. See Park, supra note 1, at 1477 (citing Tomain, supra note 50, at 35).
156. See id.
157. GDPR, supra note 18, art. 17.
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longer want their data used or stored by data controllers to
require the controller remove the data from its system, provided
there is no legitimate reason for keeping it.158 The right to be
forgotten does, however, have exceptions. “[T]he right of
freedom of expression and information, compliance with other
obligations under the European Union or member state laws, for
reasons of public interest and public concerns, for archiving
purposes, and the exercise and establishment of law enforcement
and legal claims” indemnifies controllers from complying with
the right to be forgotten under Article 16.159 In the case of Google
Spain SL v. AEPD and Costeja Gonzalez, the ECJ specified that the
privacy protection “rights override, as a rule, not only the
economic interest of the operator of the search engine but also
the interest of the general public in having access to that
information.”160 The language of this opinion illustrates the
degree to which the GDPR prioritizes consumer rights over those
of a company or even the public’s right to access of information.
B. Americans and US Legislators Call for Enactment of a Federally
Binding Data-Privacy Statute
While the European Union has been successful in legislating
standards for privacy protection, in the United States, the private
sector sets standards for consumer data processing and usage.
Consequently, US legislation is more business-friendly while the
GDPR focuses more on individuals’ rights.161 This businessfocused legislation emphasizes the significance the United States
places on the role of business in its society. The United States
prioritizes competitiveness and the race to innovate over
consumer autonomy and privacy rights. Even the California
Consumer Privacy Act (“CCPA”)—the most expansive data
regulation in the United States—carves out an exception from its
158. Press Release, Speech of Viviane Reding, Eur. Comm’n, The European Union
Data Protection Reform 2012: Making Europe the Standard Setter for Modern Data
Protection
Rules
in
the
Digital
Age
5
(Jan.
22,
2012), http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/12/26&f
ormat=PDF [https://perma.cc/D98P-FXJT]; see also GDPR, supra note 18.
159. GDPR, supra note 18, art. 16.
160. Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos
(AEPD), ECLI:EU:C:2014:317, ¶ 99 (May 13, 2014).
161. See discussion infra Part III (weighing the pros and cons of such a businessfocused legislation in the United States).
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privacy interest requirement by providing that the interest be
“balanced against competing interests, which may be justified if
legitimate interests derived from legally authorized and socially
beneficial activities of the government and private entities”
exist.162 Moreover, the balancing of legitimate privacy interests
against activities of governmental and private entities favors
private actors, such as large private data-mining corporations.163
In support of this view, the California Supreme Court noted
that individuals have “greater choice in dealing with private actors
than when dealing with the government.”164 The Court, however,
seems to overlook the prevalence of monopolies or monopolisticlike corporations in America. These large corporations wield
substantial influence over not only how American consumers live
their daily lives, but also how the world views the United States as
a competitor in the technological market.165 As one of only two
nations leading the tech race, 166 the United States must weigh
appeasing its citizens calling for stronger data protections against
maintaining their global technological primacy. Many tech and
corporate leaders fear over-legislation’s impact on technological
innovation and competition.167

162. Park, supra note 1, at 1469 (citing Hill v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 865
P.2d 633, 655-56 (Cal. 1994)).
163. See Park, supra note 1, at 1470 (citing Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 865 P.2d at
656).
164. Park, supra note 1, at 1470 (citing Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 865 P.2d at 633,
656).
165. See Shaoul Sussman & Matt Stoller, Why Amazon, Facebook, Google and Apple are
(July
28,
2020,
4:30
AM),
Bad
for
America,
POLITICO
https://www.politico.com/news/agenda/2020/07/28/agenda-amazon-facebookgoogle-apple-hearing-383612 [https://perma.cc/VJ73-5SQY]; see also Tom Huddleston
Jr., Bill Gates: ‘Government needs to get involved’ to Regulate Big Tech Companies, CNBC (Oct.
17, 2019, 1:16 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/10/17/bill-gates-government-needsto-regulate-big-tech-companies.html [https://perma.cc/G69B-P8VQ].
166. See, e.g., Audrey Cher, ‘Superpower Marathon’: U.S. May Lead China in Tech Right
Now — but Beijing has the Strength to Catch Up, CNBC (May 17, 2020, 9:43 PM),
https://www.cnbc.com/2020/05/18/us-china-tech-race-beijing-has-strength-to-catchup-with-us-lead.html [https://perma.cc/HF8U-YPYD].
167. See Larry Downes, How More Regulation for U.S. Tech Could Backfire, HARV. BUS.
REV. (Feb. 9, 2018), https://hbr.org/2018/02/how-more-regulation-for-u-s-tech-couldbackfire [https://perma.cc/8KH2-PQB9].
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Unlike the European Union, the United States does not
consider data privacy a fundamental right.168 Nevertheless,
Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence has found privacy an
implied protection guaranteed by the US Constitution.169 Noting
that there does not currently exist a federally-binding statute on
data-privacy protection, some states have chosen to codify
protective acts themselves.170
In 2018, California passed the CCPA. It is the first regulation
of its kind overseeing business data-collection practices in the
United States and provides the most comprehensive coverage of
data-protection.171 Despite tech companies spending millions of
dollars to oppose Assembly Bill 375 (the bill creating the CCPA),
it was ultimately passed on June 28, 2018.172 The regulation
protects consumers’ data privacy in several ways. The CCPA grants
consumers (1) the right to request businesses delete any of the
consumer’s personal information; (2) the right to request
businesses that sell personal information disclose categories of
information sold and identify third parties to which it was sold;
and (3) the right to opt out of the sale of their personal
information.173 As much protection as the CCPA affords
California consumers, it still errs on the side of protecting
businesses more than the general public. The bill requires that
businesses be provided “thirty-day written notice to ‘cure’ any

168. See Park, supra note 1, at 1465 (citing LEE A. BYGRAVE, INTERNET GOVERNANCE
CONTRACT 23, 118 (2015) (noting that a right of privacy is not directly expressed
anywhere in the US Constitution, including in the Bill of Rights)).
169. See Park, supra note 1, at 1468 (citing Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 564-65
(2003); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453
(1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965)).
170. See generally H.R. 1128, 71st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2018) (enacted)
[hereinafter CCDPA]; A.B. 375, 2017-2018, Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018) [hereinafter CCPA]
(known as the Colorado Consumer Data Privacy Act and the California Consumer
Privacy Act, respectively).
171. See Park, supra note 1, at 1456 (referencing Wakabayashi, supra note 65).
172. CCPA § 1798.1000; see also Issie Lapowsky, California Unanimously Passes Historic
Privacy Bill, WIRED (June 28, 2018, 5:57 PM), https://www.wired.com/story/californiaunanimously-passes-historic-privacy-bill/ [https://perma.cc/E4P7-3G54].
173. Park, supra note 1, at 1472 (citing Lapowsky, supra note 172); Noah
Ramirez, Can
CCPA
Affect
Your
Small
Business?,
OSANO
(Oct.
30,
2019), https://www.osano.com/articles/ccpa-small-business [https://perma.cc/4KCC6FT7].
BY
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alleged violations before an action is undertaken.”174 Further,
except in cases of data breaches, citizens may not bring private
actions against corporations for privacy-related abuses.175 In
support of this stance, critics of the CCPA argue that the CCPA
would otherwise open technology companies up to too much
liability, hindering their businesses and impinging on their ability
to hire.176
In defending consumer rights, section 1798.120(a) of the
CCPA provides consumers a right to “Opt-Out” of businesses
selling their data to third parties.177 The provision states
businesses must inform consumers that their data may be
distributed and that they have a right to request it not be.178 To
satisfy this requirement, websites must include a “clear and
conspicuous link on the business Internet homepage, titled ‘Do
Not Sell My Personal Information’.”179 This link must provide
consumers with an “opt out” option.180 After a consumer has
opted-out, businesses must comply with the request and are not
allowed to contact the consumer asking permission to sell their
data again for twelve months.181
Similar to the GDPR’s right to be forgotten, section 1798.105
of the CCPA contains a “right to delete” clause.182 The provision
allows users to request that a business delete any personal
information it has collected from the user.183 Additionally, the
business must also notify any third party to whom the business has
distributed the data of the request.184 Some feel the CCPA will
174. "A consumer may only bring a private lawsuit if they first provide the business
with thirty-days written notice identifying specific provisions that have been violated.”
Park, supra note 1, at 1487 (citing CCPA § 1798.150(b)(1)).
175. “As the CCPA is currently written, only the AG can sue for most violations, with
an exception for private right of action under section 1798.150.” Park, supra note 1, at
1487 (citing CCPA § 1798.150(a)(1)).
176. See Park, supra note 1, at 1473 (citing Lapowsky, supra note 172); see also James
Harvey & Gavin Reinke, The CCPA Could Reset Data Breach Litigation Risks, JDSUPRA (Aug.
20,
2019),
https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/the-ccpa-could-reset-data-breach14801/ [https://perma.cc/G89A-YUVU].
177. CCPA § 1798.120(a).
178. See id. § 1798.120(b).
179. Id. § 1798.135(a)(1).
180. See id.
181. See id. § 1798.135(a)(5).
182. Id. § 1798.105(a).
183. See id.
184. See id. § 1798.105(c).
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serve as a precedent in state-level data privacy regulation and
await other states to follow suit.185
Currently, there is no federal statute in the United States
regarding data privacy protection,186 and instead, federal agencies
stepped in to fill the gap. The Federal Trade Commission has
broadly relied upon Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission
Act (“FTC Act”) to vindicate consumer protection violations,
“including in the context of data privacy and security.”187 Section
5 of the FTC Act prohibits “unfair or deceptive acts or practices
in or affecting commerce.”188 Under the authority allegedly
vested by Section 5 of the FTC Act, the FTC has been pursuing
companies who violate data privacy and security practices on an
individual basis and seeking either injunctive or monetary relief
against them, citing Section 13(b) of the Act as a grant of
authority.189 The FTC has found that the monetary pressure of
paying fines and litigation costs has kept companies compliant
with Section 5.190
Currently, however, there are two cases pending before the
Supreme Court that could potentially constrict the FTC’s
interpretation of Section 13(b).191 Depending on the outcome,

185. “[D]ata privacy remains high on the agenda of California legislators and will
likely sweep across the United States as more states jump on the bandwagon to ensure
greater data protection for its residents.” Park, supra note 1, at 1488.
186. See Emily Birnbaum & Harper Neidig, State Rules Complicate Push for Federal
(Mar.
5,
2019
6:00
AM),
Data
Privacy
Law,
HILL
https://thehill.com/policy/technology/432564-state-rules-complicate-push-for-federaldata-privacy-law [https://perma.cc/UV9Z-9SRU].
187. Céline M. Guillou, How the FTC’s Enforcement of Data Privacy and Security May be
Impacted by the U.S. Supreme Court’s Upcoming Review of the FTC’s Use of Section 13(b),
LEXOLOGY (Sept. 30, 2020), https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=37fdf8284a9a-4aa2-8f20-f8f6bb0e1ce0 [https://perma.cc/UV9Z-9SRU].
188. Federal Trade Commission Act, 75 P.L. 447, 52 Stat. 111, 75 Cong. Ch. 49.
189. See Guillou, supra note 187.
190. See id.
191. See id. (referring to FTC v. Credit Bureau Ctr., LLC, 937 F.3d 764 (7th Cir.
2019)). In FTC v. Credit Bureau Center, LLC, the FTC sued Credit Bureau Center, LLC
(“Brown”) under §13(b) of the Federal Trade Commission Act (“FTCA”), 15 U.S.C. §
53(b), alleging that its websites and referral system violated several consumer-protection
statutes. Upholding the FTC’s victory, the Seventh Circuit found §13(b) of the FTC Act
provided for injunctive relief and temporary restraining orders, and that both §§45(I)
and 57b(b) “expressly authorized additional equitable remedies,” but that “section
13(b) lacked comparable language,” Credit Bureau Ctr., LLC, 937 F.3d at 764. District
courts also have authority to order equitable monetary relief under §13(b) of the FTC
Act. FTC v. AMG Capital Mgmt., LLC, 910 F.3d 417 (9th Cir. 2018).
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the FTC may be constrained from obtaining equitable relief
against corporate deceptive or unfair practices.192 Some fear the
decisions could impact some corporations’ willingness to provide
transparent, fair, and non-deceptive disclosures to consumers.193
Others feel the rulings may expand the FTC’s enforcement
authority by providing clearer guidelines on how the FTC handles
data privacy and security.194 They argue the many recent
“egregious corporate data privacy and security fails” may bring
legislators closer to a federal privacy law.195 Currently, Congress is
deliberating numerous proposed bills outlining how corporations
should handle data privacy, security, and enforcement. The
following Sections examine two of the most comprehensive bills
pending before Congress: the Consumer Online Privacy Rights
Act (“COPRA”) and the Digital Accountability and Transparency
to Advance Privacy Act (“Data Privacy Act”).
COPRA is a bill introduced in the Senate that sets
requirements for organizations that collect, process, or share a
consumer’s data.196 If passed, the bill will require data-gathering
entities to: (1) make their privacy policies publicly available and
inform individuals about how their data is being used; (2) delete
or amend an individual’s data upon request; (3) export reports
in a readable format, upon request; (4) establish data security
practices to protect confidentiality and accessibility of consumer
data; and (5) designate a privacy officer and a data security officer
to implement and conduct privacy and data security programs
and risk assessments.197 The bill prohibits companies from,
among other things, engaging in deceptive or harmful data
practices, processing or transferring an individual’s sensitive data
without affirmative express consent, and providing a service or
product conditioned upon an individual’s waiver of privacy
rights.198 Additionally, the bill requires the FTC to establish a new
bureau specifically tasked with enforcing its provisions.199 In sum,
COPRA holds accountable entities who process personally
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.

See id.
See id.
See id.
Id.
S. 2968, 116th Cong. (1st Sess. 2019).
Id.
S. 2968, 116th Cong. (1st Sess. 2019).
See id.
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identifiable information.200 Aside from accountability, the bill
gives individuals a right of access, deletion, data minimization,
and data security.201 Finally, though the bill would be a federal
statute, it would provide minimum guidelines for state level dataprivacy coverage.202
Like COPRA, the Data Privacy Act establishes requirements
for businesses that “collect, process, store, or disclose
information.”203 Unlike COPRA, however, the bill only places
security requirements on data processors who collect from at least
3,000 people per any twelve-month period.204 Further, the bill
does not cover data pertaining to employment or restrict use of
publicly available governmental records.205 The Data Privacy Act
requires businesses to: (1) “provide consumers with accessible
notice of the business’ privacy practices with respect to such
information”; and (2) “if meeting a certain revenue threshold,
appoint a privacy officer to oversee compliance with the
information privacy standards of the bill.”206 Though the bill
outlines when a company should appoint a privacy officer, the bill
does not elaborate as to what that “threshold” is. The bill further
calls on the FTC to enforce requirements of limiting the scope
and reasoning, allowing consumers to amend, and examining the
impact of user data on covered businesses.207 Finally, the bill
requires the National Science Foundation to include research
and instructions on encrypting or removing personally

200. See, e.g., Jesse Woo, Jan Whittington & Ronald Arkin, Note, Urban Robotics:
Achieving Autonomy in Design and Regulation of Robots and Cities, 52 CONN. L. REV. 319, 374
(2020) (citing Consumer Online Privacy Rights Act, S. 2978, 116th Cong. § 2(9) (2019),
https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/senate-bill/2968/text.
[https://perma.cc/E4G9-7E8M]).
201. See id. (citing Consumer Online Privacy Rights Act, S. 2978, 116th Cong. §§
101-10 (2019), https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/senate-bill/2968/text
[https://perma.cc/2GYX-RFJ4]).
202. See id.
203. Digital Accountability and Transparency to Advance Privacy Act, S. 583, 116th
Cong. (2019).
204. See id.
205. See id.
206. See id.
207. See id.
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identifiable elements from collected consumer data within its
information security grants program.208
In sum, the United States does not have federally-binding
data privacy laws or standard methods of regulation. As such,
some states209 have taken it upon themselves to create legislation
protecting consumer data.210 As a response to the plethora of data
breaches corporations have faced over the past several years,211
legislators have drafted several proposed bills calling for federal
data privacy laws, such as COPRA and the Data Privacy Act.
C. China’s Surveillance State Affords its Citizens Data Protections
Historically, Chinese laws have offered citizens significantly
fewer privacy protections than those of other nations.212 Of the
few privacy laws in place, China’s cybersecurity law (“CSL”)—the
most comprehensive of any Chinese privacy protection yet
enacted—213 focuses more on national security than on securing
individual privacy rights.214 Even in its provisions that do not
implicate national security, the laws center around consumer
privacy protections rather than rights derived as citizens.215 Still,
the CSL, alongside China’s Personal Information Security
Specification (2018 Specification)—which sets standards for data
collection, use, and sharing and concisely defines “consent”—216
is more comprehensive than anything the United States has
enacted, though it is less stringent than the GDPR. Regarding
data collection and processing, data breaches, and oversight, the
CSL resembles US laws.217 Conversely, the 2018 Specification sets
much stronger protections in the areas of transparency, limiting
208. See Cong. Rsch. Serv., Summary S.583 – 116th Congress (2019-2020), U.S. CONG.,
https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/senate-bill/583
[https://perma.cc/2QKK-MUS2] (last visited Mar. 1, 2020).
209. The states referred to are specifically California and Colorado regarding the
California Consumer Privacy Act and the Colorado Consumer Data Privacy Act,
respectively. H.R. 1128, 71st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2018) (enacted).
210. See generally CCPA.
211. See supra Section II.A.
212. See Lin, supra note 23, at 266 (referencing Fry, supra note 23, at 440).
213. See Emmanuel Pernot-Leplay, China’s Approach On Data Privacy Law: A Third
Way Between the U.S. and The European Union?, 8 PENN. ST. J. L. & INT’L AFF. 49, 73 (2020).
214. See Sacks, supra note 27.
215. See Pernot-Leplay, supra note 213, at 54.
216. See Shi et al., supra note 21.
217. See discussion infra Section III.C.1.
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additional processing, and increasing autonomy rights, echoing
the same protections enumerated in the GDPR.218
1. Sections of the CSL Bear Resemblance to United States Laws
a. Data Collection and Processing Requirements: Consent and
Data Quality
In the European Union, lawfulness of data processing
depends on legal principles of: (1) consent from the data subject;
(2) a contract to which the data subject is party; (3) the necessity
of processing data to advance vital interests; (4) compliance with
any legal obligations; (5) the carrying-out of a task in the public
interest; or (6) the necessity of processing data for the “legitimate
interests of the data controller unless the rights and freedoms of
the data subject override them.”219 However, in the United States
and China, the main determinant of the legality of data
processing is this first principle: consent.220 The United States,
European Union, and China all require data subjects’ consent to
data controllers’ use and processing of their data, though Article
6 of the GDPR defines giving consent much narrower than the
United States and China do.221 In the European Union, consent
must be “freely given, informed and unambiguous, which
excludes implicit consent.”222 The United States requires an
individual to consent to data processing,223 but infers such
consent from a user using a website that has privacy policies
rather than requiring explicit consent.224 Similarly, China’s CSL
218. See discussion infra Section III.C.2.
219. See Pernot-Leplay, supra note 213, at 83 (drawing from the Directive
95/46/EC, UK’s DP Act of 1998 and Netherland’s WBP (which are laws implementing
the Directive), the OECD Guidelines, and the Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1970 in the
United States).
220. See Pernot-Leplay, supra note 213; see also infra Section IV.A.1.
221. See GDPR, supra note 18, art. 6.
222. Pernot-Leplay, supra note 213, at 83 (summarizing the definition of consent as
laid out in the GDPR art. 6).
223. See Paul M. Schwartz, The European Union-U.S. Privacy Collision: a Turn To
Institutions and Procedures, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1966, 1976-77 (2013); see also Noah Ramirez,
Data Privacy Laws: What You Need to Know in 2020, OSANO (Nov. 8, 2020),
https://www.osano.com/articles/data-privacy-laws [https://perma.cc/G4ZA-VS6Z].
224. Default collection is permissible in the absence of a law explicitly forbidding
it. See Schwartz supra note 223, at 1976 (distinguishing between the EU data regime and
that of the United States, noting “the United States does not rely on a notion that
personal information cannot be processed in the absence of a legal authorization.
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requires only consent for data collection and processing and
allows for consent to be implied.225 Nonetheless, the CSL does not
allow for default collection or processing.226 It includes
exemptions to obtaining consent which overlap with some of the
GDPR’s legal bases. Consent is unnecessary for purposes of
protecting national security, preserving public health,
conducting criminal investigations, protecting lives or “major
lawful rights” of the data subject, or accessing previously lawfully
and publicly disclosed information.227
Another distinction between the data protection regimes of
the three states is their treatment of data quality. The data quality
principle, as outlined in the GDPR, necessitates that personal
data intended for collection be “accurate and, where necessary,
kept up to date; every reasonable step must be taken to ensure
that personal data that are inaccurate, having regard to the
purposes for which they are processed, are erased or rectified
without delay.”228 The United States sets data quality standards in
some federal laws, but unevenly applies its principles across state
laws.229 Again, following the United States’ vague application of
privacy practices, neither the CSL nor the 2018 Specification
mention data quality.230 Regarding consent and data quality,
China seems to follow the United States’ lead on systematic
application of privacy principles.
b. Data Breach Repercussions and Oversight Committees
Protection of data security is essential to maintaining
confidentiality and security of users’ personal data. When data
Rather, it permits information collection and processing unless a law specifically forbids
the activity.”).
225. Drafters of the CSL and the 2018 Specification stated that explicit consent is
only required where the phrase “explicit consent” is expressly written, not everywhere
“consent” is used. See Samm Sacks, China’s Emerging Data Privacy System and GDPR, CTR.
FOR STRATEGIC & INT’L STUD. (Mar. 9, 2018), https://www.csis.org/analysis/chinasemerging-data-privacy- system-and-gdpr [https://perma.cc/8WR5-NFWZ] [hereinafter
Sacks II].
226. See Pernot-Leplay, supra note 213, at 84.
227. See Pernot-Leplay, supra note 213, at 85 (referencing 2018 Specification art.
5.4 (a)-(f)).
228. GDPR, supra note 18, art. 5.1(d).
229. See, e.g., Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C § 552a(e)(5); see also discussion supra
Section III.B.
230. See Pernot-Leplay, supra note 213, at 86.
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breaches occur, most nations require data controllers to provide
notification of such breaches.231 The European Union has
dedicated supervisory authorities in place to monitor data
breaches.232 On the other hand, the United States and China do
not have designated oversight committees. Moreover, the
consequences for a data controller’s inaction after a breach has
occurred also differs by nation.
The CSL contains a vague requirement of security for
personal data.233 The 2018 Specification is similarly vague, but
explicitly mentions that “data controllers should ‘possess the
appropriate security capacity taking into account the security risks
faced, and employ sufficient management and technical
measures to protect the confidentiality, integrity, and availability
of personal information.’”234 In the event of a data breach, all
three states require disclosure to authorities and specify steps to
remediation. China’s CSL requires data controllers to inform not
only authorities, but also compromised individuals of such
breaches.235 The 2018 Specification specifies such requirements
and compels companies to give full incident reports to
enforcement agencies in the event of a breach and conduct
cybersecurity drills annually.236 The laws require data controllers
to inform authorities and individuals of the breach “promptly,”
but does not specify a timeframe.237 Similarly, most US statutes
only require notifications to be made within a reasonable time.238
In the European Union, however, data controllers must notify
supervisory authorities within seventy-two hours of the controller

231. See id.
232. See id.
233. CSL articles 40 and 42 set out certain, vague requirements such as network
operators maintaining user confidentiality over the information they collect, establishing
protection systems, and adopting measures that ensure protection of the personal
information they gather. See Creemers, supra note 20.
234. Pernot-Leplay, supra note 213, at 87 (quoting 2018 Specification art. 4 (f)).
235. See Creemers, supra note 20, art. 42.
236. Pernot-Leplay, supra note 213, at 88-89 (citing 2018 Specification arts. 9.1(a),
(b)).
237. Id. at 89.
238. See, e.g., California Data Security Breach Notification Law, § 1798.29 (a),
1798.82 (a) (California S.B. 1386) (stating “disclosures shall be made in the most
expedient time possible and without unreasonable delay”).
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becoming aware of the breach.239 They also must notify the data
subject if there is a risk to their safety or autonomy.240
Regarding oversight committees, the European Union
follows the OECD Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and
Transborder Flows of Personal Data (“OECD Privacy
Guidelines”) for data privacy.241 The United States does not have
a designated regulatory oversight authority but distributes
oversight responsibilities among a broad array of government
bodies including: the US Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”),
state attorneys general, the Federal Communications
Commission (“FCC”), the Securities and Exchange Commission
(“SEC”), and more.242 Of these, the FTC has assumed the
responsibility of enforcing privacy protections in the United
States.243 China’s CSL also delegates data protection to several
regulators, rather than a single organized, EU-style task force.244
Chinese authorities take a sectorial approach to regulation but
fall short of effectively delegating responsibility among oversight
groups.245
Another issue with these systems is the enforcement of
violation penalties. Chinese companies responsible for data
breaches may face fines for their actions, but those fines are
limited to the greater of either “RMB 1,000,000 (USD 150,000)
or ten times the amount of unlawful gains from the misuse of

239. GDPR, supra note 18, art. 33(1).
240. See GDPR, supra note 18, art. 34.
241. See Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data
(OECD Privacy Guidelines), 1980, OECD, https://www.oecd.org/sti/ieconomy/2013oecd-privacy-guidelines.pdf [https://perma.cc/HSR7-FR8C] (last visited Mar. 2, 2021).
The OECD member countries are asked to “establish privacy enforcement authorities,
free from instructions, bias or conflicts of interest, with the governance, resources and
technical expertise necessary to exercise their powers effectively and to make decisions
on an objective, impartial and consistent basis.” Pernot-Leplay, supra note 213, at 89
(quoting OECD Privacy Guidelines P 19(c)).
242. See ALAN C. RAUL, UNITED STATES, THE PRIV., DATA PROT. AND CYBERSECURITY.
REV. 269 (Alan Charles Raul et al. eds., 4th ed. 2017); The list includes: the US Federal
Trade Commission, state attorneys general, the Federal Communications Commission,
the Securities and Exchange Commission, financial and banking regulators like the
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, the Department of Health and Human Services,
the Department of Education, the judicial system, and the US plaintiffs’ bar.
243. See discussion supra Section III.B.
244. See Pernot-Leplay, supra note 213, at 90 (referring to Article 8 of the CSL).
245. See Bo Zhao & G.P. (Jeanne) Mifsud Bonnici, Protecting EU Citizens’ Personal
Data in China: a Reality or a Fantasy?, 24 INT’L J. L. & INFO. TECH. 128, 135 (2016).
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data.”246 This fine may seem insignificant to large corporations,
however the CSL grants regulators the authority to “temporarily
suspend business operations, shut down the website or even
cancel business licenses and relevant operations permits . . . ”
upon a company’s breach of data privacy.247
In comparison, China’s sectoral regulation of data breach
violations resembles the United States’ approach whereby several
different oversight committees are responsible for responding to
data security breaches.248 Enforcement of violations in both
nations is based on a case-by-case analysis, with set maximums for
monetary enforcement.249 On the contrary, while the GDPR
allows regulators to issue fines based on company turnover, those
fines tend to be highly deterrent and are enforced by a designated
data breach security team.250
2. China’s Laws Echo the GDPR on Key Issues
Two principles central to the GDPR are the data
minimization principle and the sensitivity principle. In the 2018
Specification, China has adopted standards mirroring the GDPR
on these two topics. The United States, on the other hand, barely
refers to them.
a. Transparent Data Usage Practices and Limitations on
Additional Processing
The data minimization principle, as expressly outlined in the
GDPR, allows data collection and processing of only the
minimum amount of data necessary to fulfil the purpose for
which it was collected.251 Once the data controller no longer
needs the data, the principle requires its erasure.252 In the United
States, the Privacy Act mandates governmental records contain
“only such information about an individual as is relevant and
necessary to accomplish a purpose,”253 though the Act does not
provide limitations on retention periods. Additionally, neither
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.

Pernot-Leplay, supra note 213, at 91.
Id. (citing CSL art. 64).
See discussion supra Section III.C.1.b.
See id.
See id.
See GDPR, supra note 18, recital 39, art. 5.1(c).
See GDPR, supra note 18, art. 5.1(e).
Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(1).
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the FTC nor the CPPA explicitly mention the principle.254 Suffice
to say, application of the principle across the United States is
inconsistent, at best.
China’s CSL and 2018 Specification seem to reflect the
GDPR in their approach to the data minimization principle. The
CSL prohibits collection of personal data unrelated to a
legitimate purpose and requires network operators acting as data
controllers to follow the data minimization principle.255 The 2018
Specification further requires data collectors to follow the data
minimization principle and delete data when the original
purpose for collection is fulfilled.256
The second principle facilitating transparent data practices
is the sensitivity principle. This concept recognizes that certain
content necessitates additional safety protections based on the
sensitivity of the information contained therein.257 Some
information, such as credit card numbers and bank account
information, should be protected more stringently than a user’s
fantasy football picks because of the consequences of stealing
one’s financial information, like identity theft, loss of finances,
credit depreciation, and much more. Unlike the US public
regime,258 the GDPR adheres to this principle and considers
information such as socioeconomic background, political
opinions, religious beliefs, union membership, criminal
convictions, and genetic or biometric data as some of the
protected classes of personal data.259 While both China and the
European Union place increased protective measures on sensitive
data, China adopts a risk-based approach to classifying data as

254. See Pernot-Leplay, supra note 213, at 94 (stating “The data minimization
principle is absent from the FTC’s list of fair information practice principles but exists in
the list provided by the Department of Homeland Security. It is not an express
requirement in the CCPA.”) (citing DHS, Fair Information Practice Principles (FIPPs),
DEP’T HOMELAND SEC’Y (2015), https://www.dhs.gov/publication/fair-informationpractice-principles-fipps-0 [https://perma.cc/24FN-3HYF]).
255. Creemers, supra note 20, art. 41, P 2.
256. Shi, supra note 21, arts. 4(d), 6.1.
257. See Anneliese Roos, Core Principles of Data Protection Paw, 39 COMP. & INT’L L.J.
S. AFR. 121 (2006).
258. The United States does not have federal laws codifying the sensitivity principle,
although some private companies may choose to offer higher levels of protection based
on the sensitivity principle’s ideals.
259. GDPR, supra note 18, arts. 9-10.
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“sensitive.”260 According to the risk-based definition, sensitive
data are “those that, if disclosed or altered, could endanger the
safety of persons or property, harm personal reputation and
physical or psychological health, lead to discriminatory
treatment, etc.”261 Overall, the European Union is the leader in
regulating and codifying privacy protections, followed by China
which adopts similar protections with a governmental exception
to user data access and usage. The United States, thus, falls
behind both the European Union and China in privacy
protection regulations.
3. Even with New Privacy Protections, China Remains a
Surveillance State
While protections are increasing through the passing of the
CSL and the 2018 Specification, the Chinese government still
enforces laws allowing for the gathering and mining of citizens’
data, citing national security protection in doing so.262 The CSL,
as groundbreaking as it is, allows many opportunities for lawful
governmental and third-party encroachment upon citizens’
privacy rights.263 Both the public and private sectors use datagathering methods, as required by law, to assist in government
surveillance of Chinese citizens, including the “citizen score”264
system.265 The “citizen score” is a government owned, privately
operated, system whereby citizens are monitored then ranked
based on their behavior and trustworthiness in the government’s
eyes.266 Many feel this public-private sector collaboration fuels a
260. See Shi, supra note 21, art. 3.2 (listing types of sensitive data and defining the
risk-based approach).
261. Perot-Leplay, supra note 205, at 96.
262. See Arjun Kharpal, Huawei says it would never hand data to China’s government.
Experts say it wouldn’t have a choice, CNBC (Mar. 4, 2019, 8:13 PM),
https://www.cnbc.com/2019/03/05/huawei-would-have-to-give-data-to-chinagovernment-if-asked-experts.html [https://perma.cc/C69R-W2VF].
263. See Jyh-An Lee, Hacking into China’s Cybersecurity Law, 53 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
57, 100 (2018).
264. See infra note 266.
265. See Mitchell & Diamond, supra note 22.
266. See Alexandra Ma, China has started ranking citizens with a creepy ‘social credit’
system — here’s what you can do wrong, and the embarrassing, demeaning ways they can punish
you, BUS. INSIDER (Oct. 29, 2018, 12:06 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/chinasocial-credit-system-punishments-and-rewards-explained-2018-4
[https://perma.cc/U265-TWUH].
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Chinese effort to become the first nation to actualize an
omnipresent “algorithmic surveillance” system.267 The impacts of
such a system will greatly alter how Chinese citizens and
corporations operate within the nation.
Today’s technological business model is largely dependent
upon data-sharing.268 Consequently, data-gathering and AIpowered surveillance technology have become deeply ingrained
in China’s economic infrastructure.269 One of China’s largest
companies, Alibaba, operates the social media app Sesame
Credit.270 The app enables Alibaba to monitor financial consumer
behavior of 100,000 Chinese citizens.271 Alibaba has privatized
China’s “citizen score” system through its user data-gathering
practices and character-rating system.272 This system helps
maintain Alibaba’s stature as one of the most competitive ecommerce companies in the world.273 As the most successful of
the only eight companies chosen to develop a credit scoring
system for the country, Alibaba is dominating the market, leaving
little room for competitors.274 While the government may
appreciate Alibaba’s product development, the company now
holds a monopolistic-like control over the market.275
While this rating system greatly benefits China’s economy,
the lack of privacy laws within this scheme has mixed impacts on
its citizens. Privacy intrusions such as cameras covering the
majority of every block,276 governmental phone-tapping, and

267. See Mitchell & Diamond, supra note 22.
268. See Perot-Leplay, supra note 205, at 111.
269. See Charlie Campbell, ‘The Entire System Is Designed to Suppress Us.’ What the
Chinese Surveillance State Means for the Rest of the World, TIME (Nov. 21, 2019, 6:39 AM),
https://time.com/5735411/china-surveillance-privacy-issues/ [https://perma.cc/5SS8M7AA].
270. Mitchell & Diamond, supra note 22.
271. See id.
272. See id.
273. See id.
274. See Lea Nonninger, Here’s Why China is Concerned About Tencent and Alibaba’s
INSIDER
(Feb.
6,
2018
9:37
AM),
Credit
Scoring
Efforts,
BUS.
https://www.businessinsider.com/china-tencent-and-alibabas-new-credit-scoringsolution-2018-2 [https://perma.cc/FF7B-VX8G].
275. See id.
276. See Campbell, supra note 269 (noting that “[e]ight of the top 10 most
surveilled cities in the world are in China, according to [tech-research website]
Comparitech.”).
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other known methods of surveillance are widespread.277 Many
regard the city of Chongqing as the most surveilled city in the
world.278 Chongqing boasts a “[r]atio of one CCTV camera for
every 5.9 citizens.”279 This surveillance regime has led Chinese
citizens, particularly those of Muslim minority groups such as the
Uighurs,280 to significantly alter their behavior to meet China’s
various requirements.281 While Chinese citizens have reported
ways in which this system has positively impacted their lives (e.g.,
facilitating the return of publicly lost items),282 the ramifications
of failing to comply with the communist regime have considerably
negative impacts on citizens as well.283 The United Nations has
noted one particularly catastrophic impact of the regime, calling
the mandatory “re-education centers” in China akin to
concentration camps.284 Chinese authorities have described these
re-education centers as “vocational training and re-education
programmes that aim to alleviate poverty and counter terrorism
threats.”285 In reality, these centers are filled with Muslim citizens,
targeted “for ‘offences’ as trivial as owning a Qur’an, or
abstaining from eating pork.”286 In these so-called “vocational
training programs,” detained inmates endure forced labor,
torture, medical neglect, and coercive birth control.287 Outside of
these camps, Uighur families continue to suffer egregious
intrusions into their lives with forced quartering of Han Chinese
officials residing inside Uighur homes as an extra measure of
surveillance.288 In sum, China’s surveillance state can benefit and
harm its citizens, while corporations such as Alibaba seem to
277. See generally id.
278. See id.
279. Id.
280. See Xinjiang: China defends ‘education’ camps, BBC (Sept. 17, 2020),
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-54195325
[https://perma.cc/YB9XMJX6].
281. See Campbell, supra note 269.
282. See id.
283. See id.
284. See id.
285. See Emma Graham-Harrison, China has built 380 internment camps in Xinjiang,
(Sept.
23,
2020,
10:00
PM),
study
finds,
GUARDIAN
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/sep/24/china-has-built-380-internmentcamps-in-xinjiang-study-finds [https://perma.cc/XHQ6-JQQD].
286. See id.
287. See id.
288. See id.
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thrive under the data-gathering-friendly regime. It is possible to
use this surveillance power as a force for good, but the question
remains on whether the Chinese government can be trusted to
not abuse this power. So far, widespread abuse of this power
proves China cannot.
Overall, nations vary greatly in their enforcement of citizen
data-security provisions. While the European Union’s
implementation of the GDPR provides citizens with the greatest
privacy protections, its impact on corporations poses such risks of
stifling innovation that many feel no EU tech companies will be
able to compete with the likes of US and Chinese corporations on
the global market.289 The United States may not have federal
protections for citizens’ privacy comparable to those the GDPR
affords Europeans, however, with looser requirements, US
companies are free to develop their technology at faster rates,
thus pushing the nation toward the front of the tech race.290
Citing recent data-privacy breaches, however, Americans are
currently calling for reform.291 Legislators have introduced
numerous draft bills—currently awaiting deliberation in
Congress—that can regulate corporate America’s use of user data
by encouraging stronger consumer protections and more
transparent privacy practices.292 US legislators hope their bills will
achieve what China’s new laws currently do: promote corporate
accountability by protecting data subjects’ private information.293
Even with more regulation than the United States, China’s lack of
organized oversight committees leaves citizens nearly helpless in
any attempt at recourse against data abuse practices.294 Moreover,
289. See Nick Wallace & Daniel Castro, The Impact of the EU’s New Data Protection
(Mar.
27,
2018),
Regulation
on
AI,
CTR. FOR DATA INNOVATION
https://www2.datainnovation.org/2018-impact-gdpr-ai.pdf [https://perma.cc/6TVFE5YX].
290. See Ed Stacey, Data Privacy Laws Need Rethinking To Encourage Innovation,
(June
7,
2019,
11:08
AM),
FORBES
https://www.forbes.com/sites/edstacey/2019/06/07/data-privacy-laws-needrethinking-to-encourage-innovation/?sh=37bfa668a91a
[https://perma.cc/L7YHSL2M].
291. See Aaron Smith, Americans and Cybersecurity, PEW RES. CTR. (Jan. 26, 2017),
https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/2017/01/26/americans-and-cybersecurity/
[https://perma.cc/SJ8Q-ZTT3].
292. See discussion supra Section III.B (discussing various bills pending before
Congress).
293. See discussion supra Section III.C.
294. See id.
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the privacy principles set out in the new laws exempt the
government from their requirements when it acts in the name of
national security.295 While China’s constant surveillance of its
cities may make some feel safer, the country’s monitoring system
provides a clear path to the dissolution of anonymity.
IV. THE FINE LINE BETWEEN CONSUMER DATA
PROTECTION AND OVER-LEGISLATION
The United States’ current enforcement of data privacy
protections is inconsistent and defective. Lacking a federallybinding statute, the current state-by-state legislative framework
leads to uneven data protection practices across the nation.296
Additionally, the United States lacks a properly established
oversight committee dedicated to the enforcement of data
security.297 The FTC has assumed this role and has undertaken
the task of enforcing data privacy standards set out in various
pieces of legislation.298 Without uniform standards, however, the
FTC imposes fines and disciplinary actions on a case-by-case basis,
increasing the likelihood of differing penalties for similar
violations of hazy standards.299
The European Union, by adopting the GDPR, has avoided
the American problem of inefficient, opaque data-privacy
protections by setting clear guidelines for compliance and
enforcement.300 While adopting a GDPR-like federal statute may
solve the United States’ transparency problem, the consequences
of such rigid data regulation could jeopardize its position in the
global tech market.301 While it is true that the United States needs
to do more to establish clear data protection measures, a GDPRsized regulation would be too stifling to competition and hurt the
United States more than it protects American citizens.302
This Part begins by weighing the good that comes from the
GDPR against the risk of stifling technological development in
295.
296.
297.
298.
299.
300.
301.
302.

See discussion supra Section III.C.2.a.
See discussion infra Section IV.B.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See discussion infra Section IV.A.
See discussion infra Section IV. B.
See id.
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EU companies. It then analyzes how a GDPR-sized legislation
would be harmful to the United States.303 Finally, this Part ends
with suggestions on how the United States should balance
economic competitiveness and the sufficiency of its data
protections.
A. GDPR Takes Big Steps Against Big Tech
The GDPR’s enactment prompted a divided reaction
amongst business owners, tech experts, and foreign nations.304 On
one side of the divide are numerous data abuse victims seeking
stronger data privacy protections and proper enforcement. In the
wake of numerous data abuse scandals,305 some consumers began
favoring the privacy protections offered by the GDPR.306 The
GDPR’s strict enforcement of data protections can help victims of
data misuse to feel vindicated through fining or prosecuting data
privacy abusers. On the other side of the divide were small
businesses, techies,307 and large corporations dependent upon
data to drive technology.308
The GDPR set out rules providing for legal certainty,
opening the doors for increased consumer trust in data-driven
technology. The GDPR assuaged tensions over mistrust in tech by
assuring consumers that when a company oversteps, there will be
repercussions.309 This, in turn, allows data owners to feel safer in
303. While this Section discusses the harms of applying the GDPR to the United
States, Section IV.C highlights advantageous aspects of the GDPR which should be
applied to a federal US statute.
304. See id.
305. See discussion supra Section II.A.
306. See Andrew Martins, Consumers Want a Federal Data Privacy Law, BUS. NEWS
DAILY (Jan. 23, 2020), https://www.businessnewsdaily.com/15467-consumers-wantfederal-data-privacy-law.html [https://perma.cc/64Y7-DDEP]; see also Smith, supra note
291.
307. Techies are persons highly knowledgeable or enthusiastic about technology.
Techie, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/techie
[https://perma.cc/8TAZ-G77N] (last visited Nov. 27, 2020).
308. See Ivana Kottasová, These companies are getting killed by GDPR, CNN BUS. (May
11, 2018, 6:39 AM), https://money.cnn.com/2018/05/11/technology/gdpr-techcompanies-losers/index.html [https://perma.cc/EN54-HRWS]; see also Kate Fazzini,
Europe’s sweeping privacy rule was supposed to change the internet, but so far it’s mostly created
frustration for users, companies, and regulators, CNBC (May 5, 2019, 9:34 AM),
https://www.cnbc.com/2019/05/04/gdpr-has-frustrated-users-and-regulators.html
[https://perma.cc/3XKU-2HB9].
309. See discussion supra Section III.A.
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allowing companies access to their data, knowing the stakes for
misuse are extremely high. Likewise, the cost to businesses for
non-compliance equates to millions of dollars in fines.310 These
fines not only hold companies accountable for their actions but
can also serve as a deterrent to other potential data-abusers.311
Many companies, especially small business owners, fear for their
financial futures with the GDPR’s incommensurate fines.312
B. The United States Needs Stronger Data Protections, But Adopting
Overbroad Regulation Would Be Overwhelming
The United States currently lacks proper data protection
measures including regulation, oversight, and uniformity.
Without stronger and clearer data protections, the government’s
case-by-case analysis of what constitutes data abuse313 becomes
blurred, leading to uneven application of various laws and
arbitrarily set remedies. On the other hand, enacting a GDPRsized regulation would stifle technological innovation and
competition, and, as a result, threaten the United States’ lead
over China in the race to develop technology.
The United States’ current data privacy enforcement
measures lack uniformity. Absent a federally binding data
protection statute, many companies are left to grapple with the
myriad of state and vaguely applicable federal laws currently in
place. Many companies become confused while trying to comply
with these disorderly policies,314 leading to some good faith
businesses adhering to unnecessarily cautious practices at high
costs.315 Compliance complications may frustrate some
companies, leading to their outright refusal to use data-insights.
While this will certainly ensure the company does not run into
data privacy non-compliance issues, it can also stifle future
innovation and efficiency. For companies of any size, data insights
310. See id.
311. See id.
312. See discussion infra Section IV.B (assessing the GDPR’s privacy violations and
accompanying fines).
313. Data abuse and data misuse, while separate concepts, are used here
interchangeably.
314. See Nuala O’Connor, Reforming the U.S. Approach to Data Protection and Privacy,
COUNCIL FOREIGN REL. (Jan. 30, 2018), https://www.cfr.org/report/reforming-usapproach-data-protection [https://perma.cc/ZLT9-Z9RB].
315. See Sacks II, supra note 225.
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can drive success. Using these insights does not exclusively entail
marketing via targeted advertising. A company can use data to
understand and improve performance in stores and online,
understand consumers, and make more informed business
decisions.316 The government must provide more clarity
regarding what compliance entails while preserving companies’
ability to innovate.317 Adopting the GDPR may solve America’s
enforcement-transparency problem but would be too costly for
American businesses.
One of the biggest issues the GDPR faces is balancing
protection for consumers against the cost to technological
innovation by restricting developers’ access to data. The CCPA,
following many key GDPR principles, also faces this issue. The
GDPR and the CCPA are rigid in what they require of businesses,
and many fear this rigidity will hurt innovation and cost the
United States its position on the global technology market.318
China is the only rival to the United States in the
technological development sector. Currently, the United States is
ahead of China in the AI industry which data fuels.319 China,
however, is quickly catching up, worrying some American
technology
experts
and
businesses.320
The
Huawei
cyberespionage scandal highlighted some such American
concerns.321 The more exposed data is to Chinese corporations,
the more autonomy users risk losing when handing control over
to Huawei.322 China leading the tech race would compromise
more than just American innovation, but also threaten US
national security as pervasive surveillance becomes the norm.323
316. See Why Data is Important for Your Business, supra note 2.
317. See Will California’s New Privacy Law Be Preempted? Federal Hearings and Public
Comments
Begin,
Dorsey
&
Whitney
(Sept.
27,
2018),
https://www.dorsey.com/newsresources/publications/clientalerts/2018/09/california-new-privacy-law [https://perma.cc/4ZVX-EXH8].
318. See Lin, supra note 23, at 278 (noting that the GDPR’s rigid requirements will
hurt innovation).
319. See Tom Simonite, China is Catching up to the US in AI Research – Fast, WIRED
(Mar. 13, 2019), https://www.wired.com/story/china-catching-up-us-in-ai-research/
[https://perma.cc/JM2R-6V4H]; see also Supra Section II. See also supra note 31.
320. See id.
321. See discussion supra Section II.A.4 (discussing Huawei’s cyberespionage
scandal).
322. See id.
323. See id. See also discussion supra notes 264-71.
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While testifying before Congress, Facebook founder and
CEO Mark Zuckerberg urged legislators to recognize the careful
balance between requiring entities to obtain consent for sensitive
data collection and providing American companies room to
innovate.324 Over-regulation would place such stringent
requirements on entities that, Zuckerberg argued, America would
risk “fall[ing] behind Chinese competitors.”325 Zuckerberg is not
wrong. Chinese companies, while complying with the CSL and
2018 Specification, are already hoarding mass amounts of user
data.326 For example, Chinese tech giant Tencent Holdings’ social
media apps QQ and WeChat collect user data through their
messages, including those that users have deleted.327 This data
storage system is accessible to interested authorities, which
includes the Chinese government.328 WeChat rivals Apple’s App
Store in availability of instant in-app downloads.329 With access to
data from all of China’s WeChat users, new regulation limiting
much of American companies’ access to American data will hold
back the United States in the race for AI dominance.
The GDPR is so stifling to competition that even if the
United States considers forming alliances to propel it to the front
of the tech race, it is highly unlikely it will even consider
collaborating with any of the twenty-seven EU member states
324. See Sacks II, supra note 225 (referencing Mark Zuckerberg’s remark that
“there’s a balance that’s extremely important to strike . . . where you obtain special
consent for sensitive features like face recognition, but . . . we still need to make it so that
American companies can innovate in those areas, or else we’re going to fall behind
Chinese competitors.”).
325. Natasha Lomas, Zuckerberg urges privacy carve outs to compete with China,
(Apr.
10,
2018,
4:48
PM),
TECHCRUNCH
https://techcrunch.com/2018/04/10/zuckerberg-urges-privacy-carve-outs-to-competewith-china/ [https://perma.cc/BX5G-7777].
326. See Daniel Rechtschaffen, How China’s Tech Empire Is Being Used To Gather Data
(Jan.
9,
2018,
8:45
PM),
On
Its
Citizens,
FORBES
https://www.forbes.com/sites/danielrechtschaffen/2018/01/09/how-beijing-built-atech-empire-and-then-turned-it-against-its-citizens/#7ebb468b4424
[https://perma.cc/PR22-443D].
327. See Lin, supra note 23 (citing Devin Coldewey, Chinese Government Admits
Collection of Deleted WeChat Messages, TECHCRUNCH (Apr. 30, 2018, 2:17 PM),
https://techcrunch.com/2018/04/30/chinese-government-admits-collection-ofdeleted-wechat-messages/ [https://perma.cc/4KF2-3FFG]).
328. See Coldewey, supra note 327.
329. See Steven Millward, China’s Biggest Messaging App Is On A Collision Course With
Apple, TECHINASIA (Jan. 11, 2017), https://www.techinasia.com/wechat-instant-appsversus-apple [https://perma.cc/E9WG-LYRT].
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party to the GDPR and agree to abide by the GDPR’s
constrictions. Even if it does, the GDPR may not allow data
information exchange within such collaborations. The data
localization feature of the GDPR prohibits data sharing with nonEU member states lacking “adequate” levels of data protection.330
As a result of its enactment, companies scrambled to adapt
their policies to the GDPR rules by the designated compliance
deadline of May 25, 2018.331 Instead of restructuring their entire
practice in an incredibly short period of time, businesses instead
began “pulling users out of reach of European Union privacy laws
or blocking European Union citizens’ access to online services”
to avoid the GDPR’s harsh repercussions for non-compliance.332
Many tech magnates, including Chinese business mogul and
Alibaba Group co-founder Jack Ma, feel the GDPR’s rigidity is
responsible for Europe’s lack of technological innovation,
keeping them out of the tech race by producing substantially
fewer big tech firms as nations like the United States and China.333
Ma, in response to the GDPR, urged legislators of all nations to
focus less on tightening data-usage requirements and instead on
enacting laws with innovative capacity in mind.334 In support of
his suggestion, Ma cited China as a prime example of how a lack
of regulation was critical in allowing the early internet and mobile
phones to “flourish” and enable “Alibaba to thrive.”335 He warned
that Europe’s tendency to regulate immediately upon hearing
concerns over privacy issues will halt the union’s technological
development.336 Ma gets to the heart of nations’ apprehension to
sign onto the GDPR: technology is the way of the future and
330. See Andrew Rossow, The Birth Of GDPR: What It Is and What You Need To Know,
(May
25,
2018,
7:32
AM),
FORBES
https://www.forbes.com/sites/andrewrossow/2018/05/25/the-birth-of-gdpr-what-is-itand-what-you-need-to-know/?sh=a71f85e55e5b [https://perma.cc/C9TV-U3NJ].
331. See Park, supra note 1, at 1467-68.
332. See id. (citing Alex Hern, Facebook Moves 1.5bn Users Out of Reach of New
(Apr.
19,
2018),
European
Privacy
Law,
GUARDIAN
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/apr/19/facebook-moves-15bn-usersout-of-reach-of-new-european-privacy-law [https://perma.cc/E3Z5-H23F]). See also
Bloomberg, Blocking 500 Million Users Is Easier than Complying with GDPR, FORTUNE (May
25,
2018),
https://fortune.com/2018/05/25/gdpr-compliance-lawsuits/
[https://perma.cc/DJB4-HZJ3]).
333. See Soo, supra note 134.
334. See id.
335. See id.
336. See id.
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under the GDPR’s stifling regime, there will be no room for
growth, knocking signatory nations aside as China and the United
States continue to lead the world during this technological
revolution.
Some feel Europe is right to regulate technology, citing
concerns over citizens’ rights and well-being rather than focusing
on “money, power and technological innovation.”337 This belief,
however, betrays a narrow conception of technology’s role in our
society and polarizes the issue. Ma is correct that legislation
should consider technological progression needs in adopting
consumer protection laws. Technology is at the forefront of
society and ignoring the need for continued development not
only disregards our general reliance on technology, but reduces
the likelihood of future tech-assisted breakthroughs for
individuals or companies.
In addition to over-regulating tech, the administrators of the
GDPR wield the regulation’s punitive power too aggressively. The
fines GDPR regulation committees impose on data abusers may
be too harsh in certain scenarios, especially when small-businesses
are subjected to the GDPR’s one-size-fits-all punitive system.338
Under the GDPR, one violation can cost startups their business.
To ensure compliance, a business may be spending an exorbitant
amount on compliance officers, licenses, and reporting measures,
before even beginning its venture. Additionally, the business must
sacrifice time that would be better spent developing the startup
to ensure survival of the venture itself.339 Once in place, the fines
continue, becoming even more expensive for a business’ failure
to maintain compliance standards.340 According to the Financial
Times, the more governmental oversight there is over a business’s
337. Why Europe is right to regulate tech: Jack Ma got it wrong, SOUTH CHINA MORNING
POST
(May
22,
2019,
5:00
PM),
https://www.scmp.com/comment/letters/article/3010989/why-europe-right-regulatetech-jack-ma-got-it-wrong [https://perma.cc/ZSY5-5DP7].
338. See infra text accompanying note 339. But see Stephen P. Mulligan et al., Cong.
Rsch. Serv., R45631, Data Protection Law: An Overview 46-47 (2019).
339. See GDPR, supra note 18, art. 83 (outlining finable infringements); see also
Kottasová, supra note 308 (stating “[c]omplying with the new regulations isn’t cheap,
and experts say the world’s biggest companies are spending tens of millions of dollars to
prepare. Smaller companies that do not have the same resources are struggling.”).
340. See GDPR, supra note 18, art. 83 (discussing infringements that carry harsher
penalties for violations such as data processing and consent violations articulated in
Article 5).
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daily operations, the slower the growth of the business in a time
where speed is one of the most important factors in technological
development.341 In contrast, the CCPA fixes a maximum fine on
violations at US$ 7,500, an amount that is practically negligible to
tech giants. 342 Further, the statute only punishes intentional
violations which result in data breaches.343
Proponents of the GDPR cite consumer satisfaction at the
enactment of the regulation. In the wake of numerous data-abuse
scandals, the GDPR helps victims feel vindicated through its
enforcement of protections and implementation of stronger
penalties for transgressors. Advocates also emphasize the notion
of a society more trusting of corporations as an effect of more
transparent data-usage practices.344 In theory, people may begin
feeling more comfortable living alongside technology by
understanding how companies use their data for good. This, in
turn, may create technology and AI investors where once these
individuals felt distanced from technology. Additionally,
supporters of the GDPR feel the European Union’s adoption of
the regulation will encourage other jurisdictions to increase their
regulation and legislation of data privacy protection, as China
has.
C. What the United States Should Do
The United States should enact a federally binding privacy
law. This law must protect citizens, provide clear compliance
guidelines and standards for corporations, and allow room for
innovation. To accomplish these goals, the new statute should
preempt state laws for uniformity purposes. Allowing states to

341. See Guy Chazan, SAP Raises Fears Over European Union Data Privacy Rules, FIN.
TIMES (Jan. 15, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/22d5e078-d9a1-11e6-944be7eb37a6aa8e [https://perma.cc/U4PQ-FLCM] ("The penalties were too high,
"especially for just a single violation.' . . . The more bureaucracy, the more complexity
you have in your business segment, the harder it is to grow fast, and speed is what matters
these days . . . .").
342. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.155(b) (2018) (requiring the maximum fine placed
on a data breach be $7,500).
343. See id.
344. See Kevin Cochrane, To Regain Consumers’ Trust, Marketers Need Transparent
Data Practices, HARV. BUS. REV. (June 13, 2018), https://hbr.org/2018/06/to-regainconsumers-trust-marketers-need-transparent-data-practices [https://perma.cc/4ASWVZXZ].
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continue creating their own specifications exacerbates the issue
of corporations fronting the cost of complying with disparate
regulations and risking accidental non-compliance. While
allowing states to use the federal act as a default regulation may
provide for greater safety measures within that region, the burden
of state-by-state adaptations of the federally binding statute will
overwhelm compliance officers, frustrating technological
innovation efforts. Data transfers, whether from owner to
processor or processor to third party, etc., implicate interstate
commerce, triggering a host of additional compliance issues with
local level regulation.
As it currently stands, legislators are submitting numerous
local GDPR-sized bills, flooding their state legislatures at a rapid
rate.345 Ensuring continued compliance in an evolving legal
landscape is a business in itself and would be a “logistic
nightmare.”346 A single, federal privacy bill with clear terms would
ameliorate the flooding problem the current pending legislation
is about to create. In unifying compliance requirements, this
single bill would take the pressure of accidental non-compliance
off businesses and leave them free to do what they do best:
innovate. The GDPR’s uniformity is one of its redeeming
qualities. As stifling as it is, the GDPR provides a uniform standard
for compliance so companies and consumers know their rights
and obligations. However, the GDPR and the CCPA, while
successful in some capacities, might not be suitable for federal
application, placing too much responsibility on tech operators
unfamiliar with legal compliance operations.347
To accomplish the goal of providing clear compliance
standards, new legislation should feature clear terms that frame
345. Comparison Chart of Pending CCPA and GDPR-like State Privacy Legislation, AKIN
GUMP (May 29, 2019), https://www.acc.com/sites/default/files/2019-06/2019-0530%20Akin%20Gump%20HANDOUTState%20Privacy%20Legislation%20Comparison%20Chart.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Y6UG-TJT9].
346. See Lin, supra note 23, at 277 (citing Julie Bernard, Consumer Data Privacy: Why
We Need a (Single) Federal Law, FORBES (Mar. 29, 2019, 6:00 AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbesagencycouncil/2019/03/29/consumer-dataprivacy-why-we-need-a-single-federal-law/#6e7d8687623f
[https://perma.cc/PU7R9ZHR]).
347. See Lin, supra note 23, at 277 (citing Fahmida Y. Rashid, Congress May Consider
a U.S. Version of GDPR, DECIPHER (Nov. 9, 2018), https://duo.com/decipher/congressmay-consider-a-us-version-of-gdpr [https://perma.cc/8AUS-CNQC]).
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compliance in an easily understandable way. Some could argue
broader laws allow for greater flexibility—a principle-based
regulatory regime may be more accommodating to startups than
a rules-based approach. On the other hand, vaguely defined key
legal terms can lead to confusion regarding what constitutes
compliance.348 With clearer terms, companies will have a better
sense of what compliance entails. This seemingly obvious solution
will help entities continue to innovate while complying with the
law and without placing an undue burden on them.
Many agree that data processors should first obtain consent
before mining a user’s data.349 Consent, however, is not as clear a
term as it may seem. One data privacy principle providing for
more transparent practices includes requiring “Opt-In,” rather
than “Opt-Out” consent. Opt-In consent requires data processors
to receive the data subjects’ “express, affirmative and informed
consent” before processing their data.350 This can either mean:
(1) a subject affirmatively agrees to allow a processor complete
use and disclosure of his data or, (2) by agreeing to the
processor’s terms, the user allows the processor to use the data of
any other on the same browser with the same IP address on which
the original user accepted the processor’s terms.351 For example,
in this second definition, in a household that shares one
computer, one resident agreeing to a processor’s terms
automatically means the processor may use any data stored on the
computer, regardless of which household member generated
such data. These two constructions of the term “Opt-In
requirement” represent only a couple of ways in which “consent”
may be interpreted. To avoid the ambiguity in the situation set
348. See Lin, supra note 23, at 278 (citing The CCPA - Making Things Worse, ANA
(Mar. 4, 2019), https://www.ana.net/blogs/show/id/rr-blog-2019-01-The-CCPAMaking-Things-Worse [https://perma.cc/5K4P-9RDW]); see also Sam Sabin, Fresh Off
GDPR, Companies Puzzle Over Complying With California’s Privacy Law, MORNING CONSULT
(Dec. 18, 2018, 1:00 PM), https://morningconsult.com/2018/12/18/fresh-off-gdprcompanies-now-have-to-prepare-for-californias-privacy-law/ [https://perma.cc/4HWHKKCC] (“[CCPA] creates ‘unworkable obligations’”).
349. See Thomas C. Redman & Robert M. Waitman, Do You Care About Privacy as
Much as Your Customers Do?, HARVARD BUS. REV. (Jan. 28, 2020),
https://hbr.org/2020/01/do-you-care-about-privacy-as-much-as-your-customers-do
[https://perma.cc/QQ2B-8F4Q].
350. Tomain, supra note 50, at 4.
351. Nicklas Lundblad & Betsy Masiello, Opt-In Dystopias, 7 SCRIPTED 155, 158
(2010).
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out above, this new privacy statute should clearly define consent
while establishing stringent compliance standards.
A federal data privacy statute should require processors
obtain consent to data gathering, processing, mining, and
distributing from the user, with an option for users to decline all
data-usage methods while retaining access to the processor’s
services. The processor may incentivize sharing data but may not
coerce consent. The processor must first obtain consent from the
data subject before sharing his data with a third party. The data
processor must explicitly state to whom the user’s data is
distributed and for what purpose(s). Each time the processor
wants to share user data with another party, the processor must
re-obtain consent from the original user.
Even with clear terms, some processors fear obtaining
consent will be detrimental to their ability to process data and
thus limit their ability to innovate.352 On the contrary, most tech
users will not care to read terms and conditions and will often
click “I agree” when prompted. For the minority who have
concerns about their data’s usage, however, they can opt out of
data-share feature without having to forego using a company’s
product. So, some may question why service providers and
regulators should care about the scant minority of users who do
not want to share their data in exchange for using a company’s
services. Assuming only one percent of the US population cares
to read terms and conditions and would have a problem with
sharing their data, that equals about 3.3 million people.353 The
services these millions of Americans cannot use include those of
giants like Google, Amazon, Walmart, and more. While one
percent may seem insignificant, it is enough users to cause
potential economic turmoil for even some of the largest

352. See, e.g., Daniel Castro & Michael McLaughlin, Ten Ways the Precautionary
Principle Undermines Progress in Artificial Intelligence, INFO. TECH. & INNOVATION FOUND.
(Feb. 4, 2019), https://itif.org/publications/2019/02/04/ten-ways-precautionaryprinciple-undermines-progress-artificial-intelligence [https://perma.cc/HZM4-GQT3]
(“Policies that require firms to get prior consent before using commercial applications
of AI, including facial recognition, can actually delay improvements in consumer
experiences.”).
353. See Population Estimates, July 1, 2019 (V2019) – United States: Quick Facts, U.S.
CENSUS
BUREAU,
https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/US/PST045219
[https://perma.cc/LLH8-ELUM] (last visited Mar. 2, 2021).
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corporations. Google’s annual revenue is US$ 160.74 billion.354 In
the US alone, Google has 246 million users.355 This means a loss
of one percent of Google’s US users will cost Google over US$
1.607 billion per year. This example shows the impact to massive
corporations: the consequences of losing even one percent of
customers overnight to average-sized businesses would be
devastating.
While corporate data mishandling scandals continue to
surface as quickly as levels of user mistrust grow, no amount of
abuse is likely to push users completely offline and end society’s
dependence upon the internet. Despite rising data misconduct,
few users have followed through on their threats of shutting down
their social media accounts.356 For this reason, consumer
protection needs to be at the forefront of drafters’ concerns,
alongside the idea that reliance upon American-developed
technology will only improve the United States’ global market
stance.
A new federal privacy bill should explicitly establish a
regulatory enforcement committee. If the drafters of the new law
choose to accept that regulatory oversight is the FTC’s role, it
should clearly delineate the FTC’s powers. The best idea would
be to establish a designated task force exclusively committed to
data privacy security, whether that be a bureau under the FTC or
a new federal agency altogether. This task force would replace the
current redundancy of compliance officers, centralizing oversight
in one task force. Compliance standards as well as repercussions
should be clearly enumerated in the regulation along with

354. See J. Clement, Google: annual revenue worldwide 2002-2019, STATISTA (Feb. 5,
2020),
https://www.statista.com/statistics/266206/googles-annual-global-revenue/
[https://perma.cc/J7R9-9CX8].
355. See Deyan Georgiev, 111+ Google Statistics and Facts That Reveal Everything About
the Tech Giant, REV. 42 (Nov. 21, 2020), https://review42.com/google-statistics-and-facts/
[https://perma.cc/Z2NY-S3CP].
356. See Michael Gold, Senators Had a Lot to Say About Facebook. That Hasn’t Stopped
TIMES
(Apr.
12,
2018),
Them
From
Using
It.,
N.Y.
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/12/us/politics/facebook-senatorsusage.html?action=click&module=RelatedCoverage&pgtype=Article&region=Footer
[https://perma.cc/2L2S-DFRH]; but see Tiffany Hsu, For Many Facebook Users, a ‘Last
TIMES
(Mar.
21,
2018),
Straw’
That
Led
Them
to
Quit,
N.Y.
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/21/technology/users-abandon-facebook.html
[https://perma.cc/TQX2-RTUT].
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explicit data storage expiration dates, setting clear guidelines for
this new task force’s powers.
With this new committee, the United States should hold
accountable corporations who have misused user data by enacting
uniform, binding legislation that calls for more transparent datausage practices. “More transparent practices” can include using
“explainable AI”357 and obtaining consent from consumers
before sharing their data. Explainable AI refers to only using
computer algorithms that humans can comprehensively
understand, thus allowing coders to know what decisions the
computer makes and why.358 The more data consumers give to
tech companies, the more these companies can develop and
increase the United States’ tech standing, but many question if
they can trust the hands in which their data ends up.359
Explainable AI practices may alleviate these fears by producing
coders capable of explaining how computers use data and to what
ends. The GDPR enumerates similar practices, some of which the
Digital Accountability and Transparency to Advance Privacy Act
(“Data Privacy Act”) has already introduced in the Senate.360
Like the GDPR, the CCPA provides that data breaches are
not the only form of non-compliance.361 Where there are no
breaches, the company in question will face no penalties,
regardless of whether other company policies were compliant.362
This system may, on its face, seem to promote companies acting
357. See Ron Schmelzer, Understanding Explainable AI, FORBES (July 23, 2019, 7:12
AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/cognitiveworld/2019/07/23/understandingexplainable-ai/?sh=701802cb7c9e [https://perma.cc/HX3D-NA7R] (“The lack of
explainability and trust hampers our ability to fully trust AI systems. We want computer
systems to work as expected and produce transparent explanations and reasons for
decisions they make. This is known as Explainable AI (XAI).”).
358. See id.
359. See Brooke Auxier et al., Americans and Privacy: Concerned, Confused and Feeling
Lack of Control Over Their Personal Information, PEW RES. CTR. (Nov. 15, 2019),
https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/2019/11/15/americans-and-privacyconcerned-confused-and-feeling-lack-of-control-over-their-personal-information/
[https://perma.cc/5X6Q-CHLU].
360. Digital Accountability and Transparency to Advance Privacy Act, S. 583, 116th
Cong. (2019).
361. See generally Alice Marini et al., Comparing privacy laws: GDPR v. CCPA,
&
FUTURE
PRIV.
F.,
https://fpf.org/wpDATAGUIDANCE
content/uploads/2018/11/GDPR_CCPA_Comparison-Guide.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8ELV-2YM2] (last visited Mar. 2, 2021).
362. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.155 (2018).
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to restrict the number of data breaches that occur. However,
these laws merely incentivize companies to not get caught instead
of promoting the consumer interest in corporations instituting
sufficient data protection measures.363
To determine proper damages for non-compliance, a federal
law should include a percentage-based formula. Some observers
propose an algorithm that suggests fining a company for a
“maximum of two percent of its global revenue for its first
violation, and four percent for its second violation, etc.”364 This
proportionality principle would ease startups’ concerns over
being fined gross sums for mistakes at a time when they are
unlikely to have a developed compliance framework. At the same
time, major corporations and tech giants cannot brush aside the
fines which can amount to millions, dependent upon the
company’s revenue.
V. CONCLUSION
While the world continues to advance toward an AI-driven
future, nations around the world have taken steps to protect
consumer data privacy interests. The European Union enacted
the GDPR to secure individual data interests against corporate
misuse of privileged information. The expansive legislation,
however, neglects the businesses from which it protects
consumers, leaving many companies confused or unwilling to
comply with such stringent requirements that threaten to halt
technological advancement in favor of securing citizens’ data.
China, on the other hand, historically affords its citizens few
privacy rights, yet even the surveillance state has enacted
measures to prevent against unfettered data-collection. Lagging
behind the two other bodies, the United States has several local
acts aimed at residents of certain states but lacks a federally
binding data privacy statute. With China and the United States
paving the way through this technological revolution, the United
States must step up to ensure its citizens’ privacy interests are
protected, while guaranteeing American companies’ ability to
innovate will not be stifled by over-regulation of data access.

363. See O’Connor, supra note 314.
364. Greater detail is discussed in Lin, supra note 23, at 279.
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In an ideal world, companies would voluntarily implement
privacy policies that guarantee consumers fair practices and
promise not to overstep privacy bounds. Realistically, the
likelihood of companies acting against their best interests in favor
of their customers is impractical and foolish. Unreasonable as
well is the idea that companies would willingly or even have the
means to ensure their policies comply with countless local-level
statutes. The United States would therefore benefit from a
federally binding data protection statute whose requirements are
clearly and concisely spelled out, unlike those of the GDPR. This
new statute should incorporate successful aspects of the GDPR,
the CSL, and the 2018 Specifications, but must weigh protection
against barriers to innovation to maintain its stance in the global
AI race. In addition to easing the concerns of US citizens,
implementing this new statute may make the thought of living
alongside technology more palatable to wary consumers. This
new future may encourage freely sharing certain types of data
with corporations who promise to use and develop it into a
societally advantageous program.
Where once the thought of sharing data with companies or
even the government seemed overwhelming, a clearly established
and comprehensive data privacy statute may encourage
participation on the global tech market and creative
opportunities for individuals who had previously closed
themselves off to such advancements. In enacting such a law, the
United States could see tech investors emerge from industries not
traditionally connected to technology, more individuals joining
the tech workforce than before, and of course, fewer instances of
corporate data misuse. All these aspects can contribute to the
United States securing its place as the winner in the AI race.
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